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(Transcription of type portions of notes) FOREWORD 1) Seek to manifest subject and principles of science of nature. Subject? That about which we seek (reasoned) knowledge. Must determine scope of investigation. Must characterize the subject, distinguish it from others, determine aspect or formality under which subject is considered.

Principles of science? That from which (reasoned) knowledge of subject is derived, on which it is based, on which it depends. 'Science'? Word used but can't assume meaning known. Certainly is knowledge; and reasoned knowedge: knowledge of why this or that is true of subject. Passage from Meta I — art and experience. But even this not wholly adequate. Much presupposed in this passage. For clarity, must analyze an instance of 'science' in strictest sense, by comparison with which other kinds of knowledge are called 'scientific'. Example of demonstration in geometry. Example analyzed. Characteristic features determined; understanding of nature of subject grasped; manifested in its definition. Prom this definition we see that it has the given attribute; the definition provides the reason for the inherence of the attribute, and the necessitating reason or cause. Because the procedures followed in the investigation of other subjects are akin to that employed in geometry, we extend the word 'scientific' to such procedures—and the word 'science' to cover the results, the reasoned knowledge, of such investigation. Examples of 'science' is this different but related sense. Contrast them briefly to that found in geometry. Mathematics provides science par excellence. However are other discipline which truly share in the character of that science found in math. One of them found in what is called by Aris. the science of nature. Example taken from Physics. Compared to demonstration in geometry. Such examples of scientific knowledge infrequent. But they are goal of phil of nature. Thus if they could be had, would be from definitions of this cause of thing or that that we would reason to— demonstrate— this or that about the natural thing. 2) Mathematical Physics. Not yet mentioned, even though now taken as equivalent to 'science'. Separate consideration of this called for. Magnificent achievements. Is extension of phil of nature. But does it have nature of science in strict sense? Question answered in analysis of its procedure and comparison of it to that found in math and phil of nature. From what does it proceed in its reasoned knowledge of things? Symbolic construction. Not define things at all, unlike Aristotelian mode of procedure. Math physics proceeds by way of operational definition. Example of this in opposition to: a kind of definition in phil of nature. Math employed in this discipline radically different from math of ancients. .... Calculation. Character of. Contrasted with its role in ancient math. Numbers do not represent any unity on part of things Still, math physics will terminate in, as it began with, knowledge of things of nature. Quote from Einstein. Provisional character of knowledge gained in math physics. This feature perhaps most evidently reveals fact that math phys falls far short of science in strict sense, or if this not acceptable, of the kind of reasoned knowledge we would like to have of nature. It is perhaps less clear why this is the case, but the reason is nonetheless definite. Pound in kind of definition employed.

All this summary and unsatisfactory. The themes we have dealt with so briefly here will make up large part of what follows. What we have simply laid down here we shall establish in the body of this work. Forward will have served purpose if some clarification of words used has been gained, if the limited character of contemporary 'science' has been appreciated, and if the possibility of a strict science of nature has been recognized.

Sujets de communications

• 1. Mathematical abstraction, as understood by contemporary authors on"the nature of mathematics (e.g. A. N. Whitehead, B. Russell, J. Hadamard), is what we call "abstractio totius", and negative. It has nothing in common with the "abstractio formae" that is proper to mathematical science.
• 2. To equate the subject of mathematical science with the subject of the art of calculation (XoyipTi X.TJ) is to postulate intelligible matter ( uXn vorftr] ) as essential to all things and notions.
• 3. The difference between names, symbols, and infinite names; between the symbols of formal logic (termini transcendentes), of mathematics, algebra, and mathematical physics. De Morgan's views on logical symbols, infinite names, and the universe^ of discourse, examined in the light of these distinctions.
• 4. Quomodo intelligendum sit illud dictum "natura determinatur ad unum*. Qua ratione Hegel et Engels ipsis conferunt rebus quoddam esse quod habent in intellectu tantum; et in quo conveniant cum platonicis.
• 5. Agens a natura nullomodo potest esse causa per se ejus quod est a casu; qua ratione hoc proprie convenit agenti a proposito.
• 6. . Potentia simul contradictionis, vel rationalis vel naturalis, est de ratione cuiuslibet possibilis quod necessario opponitur; et semper dicit respectum ad actionem propter finem, unde ad bonum et ad appetitum.
• 7. Comme question de fait et de façon assez générale, la "nécessité qui vient de la matière" (Physique II, 9-, 199 b 34-200 a 15) est aujourd'hui considérée comiœa le postulat fondamental de toute.-science expérimentale, y compris l'économique. k .
• 8. Le terme 'hasard', commun, selon l'usage, aux expressions 'hasard dans la nature' et 'lois du hasard', est strictement équivoque.
• 9. Quodlibet opus naturae est opus alicujus substantiae intelligentis quae est causa universalis in causando; quod tamen opus a natura dicitur, ratione principii passivi. Et hoc valet ad quaestionem de possibilitate evolu-tionis.

Nulla datur generatio naturalis et univoca sine causa universali seu aequivoca actualiter et per se, generatum producente secundum rationem speciei. V. g.,quamvis Socrates sit per se causa filii ejus secundum quod iste est hic homo, non tamen per se causa est ejus quod iste filius sit homo, quia nullum particulare agens univocum potest esse simpliciter causa speciei; generando enim, Socrates esset causa speciei humanae, ideoque omnis hominis,et per consequens suimetipsius, cum ipse homo quidam sit - ut patdt ex III Contra Gentiles, c. 65, et •multis aliis locis. Causis enim debent proportionaliter respondere effectus, ut ostenditur in II Physicorum (D. Thomas, lect. 6). Et ideo, ejus quod tam Socrates quam filius unius speciei sint in re, ita ut eadem omnino ratio vere de utroque praedicetur uni voce et per. se, hoc ipsum habet causam per se et non per accidens. Quodsi generabilium non darentur causae naturaliter agentes nisi quae effectibus eaedem: sint in specie, omnia, quantum ad naturam attinet, a casu in speciem prodierent. [Videtur autem hic asse quoddam dubium, utrum scilicet consideratio de causis aequivocis solum pertineat ad meta-physicum, vel etiam ad naturalem., Sciendum est autem quod ad metaphysicum pertinet considerare de ipsa causae universalis ratione, ut patet ex Divo Thoma in VI Metaph., lect. 3. Sed ad naturalem pertinet ostendere saltem an est omnium causarum quarum proprii effectus sensu constant, et eorum quae cum materia sensibili definiuntur, ut patet de individuis ejusdem speciei; et ex ipsa motus ratione, secundum quod motus est propria passio mobilis,seu actus existent is in potentia in quantum hujusmodi; naturalis philosophus ostendit cujuslibet motus qualiscumque speciei esse unum primum movens immobile, supra omnem speciem motus existens, et extra omnium mobilium genera; cujus tamen naturam considerare ad metaphysicum pertinet. - Sed quia multi circa probationem naturalem moventis omnino immobilis decipiuntur, notandum est quod in hoc naturalis non procedit ex motu in eo quod motus participat aliquid de natura quantitatis, secundum quod divisio motus sumitur vel- ex divisione spatii vel ex divisione mobilis; ista consideratio motus pertinet ad scientias medias inter mathematicum et naturalem, .in- quibus tractatur do mensuris motuum (ut habet D, Thomas, In Boeth« de Trinit., q. 5, a. 3, ad 5). Huiusmodi autem scientiae non demonstrant nisi per causam formalem, quam a mathematicis accipiunt; non autem per agentem.

LAVAL THEOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE precepts which correspond to the relativities of the feudal social system are not held to be natural law: they are viewed as judicial precepts established by men. But such laws are variable, as St. Thomas points out in the following passage: "The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force forever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows. Consequently, when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also." 1 In the sentence immediately following the one we have just quoted, Reinhold Niebuhr says: " The confusion between ultimate religious perspectives and relative historical ones in Catholic thought accounts for the fury and self-righteousness into which Catholicism is betrayed when it defends feudal types of civilization in contemporary history as in Spain for instance."2 We are not concerned here with the truth or error of this statement. It is relevant to our discussion only insofar as it reflects a judgment on doctrine. Supposing that the attitude of the Church toward a particular form of government, at a given place and time, is really such as the author describes, could it not be precisely by virtue of its solicitude to take into account, even in the face of widespread criticism, the contingent circumstances which our sometimes oversimplified generalities about " contemporary history " tend to overlook and which we are apt to convert into general standards for every situation regardless of its peculiarity ? CHARLES DE KONINCK. 1. Ia liae. q.lM. n.3. ad 2. 2. Op. cil., p.221.

General Standards and Particular Situations in Relation to the Natural Law Speaking of Orthodox Catholicism's concept of the natural law, Reinhold Niebuhr, in his Gilford Lectures, makes the following reservation: "The difficulty with this impressive structure of Catholic ethics, finally elaborated into a detailed casuistic application of general moral standards to_eyery conceivable particular situation, is that it constantly insinuates religious absolutes into highly contingent and historical moral judgments."1 And so he speaks of " The mistake of Catholic moral casuistry to derive relative moral judgments too simply from the presuppositions of its natural law . . ." I'erhaps we should add that the same author considers " Thomistic ethics" as an instance of this rationalism.2

Yet I believe every disciple of St. Thomas would, no less than Reinhold Niebuhr, condemn any moral doctrine which would have that note. No practical judgment could be true if it were simply the result of an " application of general moral standards " to a particular situation. Moral standards arc not universal in representation, and in the field of action there is no such thing as " every conceivable particular situation." No amount of casuistic " it's " could meet and be adequate to the contingent circumstances of conduct. There can be no universal file of proximate norms for behaviour. The proper precepts of individual actions are to be found in the particular precepts of prudence — not in the law, which, natural or human, retains a certain degree of generality. No law can be the particular premise of an operative syllogism in which one infers what is to be done here and now. The outcome of reasoning from law alone could be no more than a general conclusion pertaining to practical science. If, on the other Innui, the particular premise of a syllogism were no more than the statement of a fact that is speculatively true, the syllogism would not be what we call operative; and if it alone were taken as n sufficient basis for adimi, this action would be practically false. An instance of such a type of reasoning was pointed out recently by Gabriel Marcel in his Preface to Gheorghiu's novel entitled La vingl-cin-quieme heme. Although the general premise is taken from positive law, the result would be the same if the law were a natural one:

" The writer Traian Koruga and his wife Nora, though they were always sympathetic lo the cause of I lie Allies, the more so as she was a

• A paper read at the twenty-fourth annual meeting f>t the American Catholic. Philosophical Association, held at St. Paul, Minn.. April 19f»U. Reproduced here with perinis-BÎnn, from the I'riicecilinga, Vol.XXIV.

336 LAVAL THEOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE

Jewess and barely managed to escape from persecution, have travelled, at the time of the German collapse of '45, hundreds of kilometers on foot in order to reach the American zone, of which they fondly dream as a haven of refuge. At last, they find themselves in Weimar. But it is certainly not the spirit of Goethe which inspires the American governor of that city. He cares little about what Traian and Ins wife are or think. What matters is only this: they are bearers of a Roumanian passport; Roumania is officially considered by the United States as an enemy Power; ergo, Traian and his wife must be treated as enemy subjects, and put in prison. It is most remarkable, let it be noted in passing, how easily the method of syllogistic reasoning — in which, until a comparatively recent dato, so many short-sïghtcdt thinkers imagined to hold the very instrument of Reason — comes to subserve whatever aberration of Reason. It is really a machine, with which (as .with all other machines, for that matter) one may do what one likes. True thought is something entirely different." Why is the conclusion, in this particular instance, a practical error ? Not because it is reached by " syllogistic reasoning," but because the official in question "cares little about what Traian and his wife are or think." Insofar as such a disposition is the reason why he infers that ' Traian and his wife must be treated as enemy subjects, and put into prison," the conclusion is practically false — and his reasoning is a good example of a bad operative syllogism. For practical truth docs not consist in the mind's conformity to what is, but in its conformity with the rectified appetite.1 Let us note, then, that even if the official were well-informed and knew who those two people are and Wjiat they think, he could still draw a false conclusion as to what is to be done, so long as he ** cares little." Practical reasoning i.s, not a matter of reason alone, not even of the kind of practical knowledge which is confined to reason. ' . . .Prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu... Inquantum" enim (ethica, oecohomica et politica) sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quaedam scientiae practicae."- And so we may well agree with Gabriel Marcel in condemning the kind of syllogistic reasoning he illustrates by the example we have seen. No amount of such reasoning could ever reach a practical truth. And this is the same as to say that practical reasoning, in matters of conduct, cannot consist in the simple application of a general rule to a particular so-called objective case. With Reinhold Niebuhr we must admit that a doctrine which propounds such a method as a guarantee of practical truth in action is wholly inacceptable. We share Nicbuhr's view for reasons we may quote from St. Thomas, with whom the Church has found no fault on this score.

2. ST. THOMAS, In VI Elkicor., Iei-t.7. n.1200.— CAJRTAKT, . Comm. in Iam liae, qq.57-58. For Students of Theology or for the General Public.

28. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL.

'Knowledge of good and evil' can be understood in many ways. What is meant by this expression in Genesis iii ? Why should Eve have been, first to desire such knowledge? How can this desire be sinful, since the knowledge of evil is not evil and God possesses it as no one else? Moreover, the end Eve had in mind was essentially good — in fact the highest good. The interpretation of this passage by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, How this inordinate desire is still with us — though aiming at a lower good such as security at any cost. ("And you all know security // Is mortals' chief est enemy"). Illustrations from modern philosophies and social theories.

29. ORIGINAL SIN AND THE SENSE OF TOUGH. .. Why is it that Original Sin, a purely spiritual one of revolt against God, should have affected man primarily in his lower faculties, in those which share most in the character of nature, viz. the appetites associated with the conservation of the individual and the propagation of the species ? If, on the other hand, the higher powers of man had been affected in the same way, he would be incapable of human action, and could not be held to account for what he does. The inordinate pursuit of the pleasures of touch — of food and drink, of comfort and the ardours of the flesh — is admittedly the most common of human frailties ; to the point where unruly concupiscence is called a law : lex fomitis, which provides the economic life with a basic constant. Yet each individual remains free and responsible for his actions — though not in the above-the-cloud way of existentialist 'options.'

To moderate the pleasures of touch is the proper object of the virtue of temperance (not to be confused with teetotalism). However, subservience to the law in the many remains an obvious fact that is the root of social instability and the foot-hold of the ambitious few. From earliest times, systems have been propounded to outwit the general law, most of them beginning in pride and ending in self-indulgence (Manichaeists, Cathares, Jansenists, Quietists, etc. ).

The only efficient, human method of freeing the individual from subservience to the law of concupiscence was recognized by the pagan philosopher, Aristotle (whom St, Thomas repeats on this score) to develope the right habits in the very young, by education and discipline : For "it makes no small difference whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth: it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference —' quin potius totum ex hoc dependeat. A modern philosopher, Irving Babbitt, puts it in the following terms : "If the discipline is to be effective, so that a man will like and dislike the right

Poetry and the experience of evil The poetry of our day has become so esoteric that only poets can read or understand one another. The same is true about music, music of the serial kind, for example. There is on the other hand a poetic still avidly read or seen by the non-poetic public, but its medium is usually prose not verse, the novel and not. the drama; just as there is a contemporary music which the public obviously enjoy, such as rock and roll.

It is not my business to judge the merits of a poetry that can be enjoyed by poets only; yet I will indulge for a moment some observations which might provide at least the antecedents of a judgment.— The poets themselves tell us nowadays that they write for arid expect to be understood by poets only. Mallarme was such a man. His poem is strikingly arty, but it does not move me as a rational animal. It is so arty that it appeals to cold detached reason only; it has nothing to do with me as an animal which is what I most certainly am. If I want to indulge pure reason, I prefer mathematics. Of course I am not a poet nor a musician. But this is neither here nor there. The point is that one may be allowed to enjoy Homer or Sophocles, Shakespeare or Keats and yet be a total outsider to the highest poetic achievements of this day. This observation should not be interpreted as a protest in disguise. I believe what I said to be not only true; it is also quite natural. I mean that the development is a normal one and, in a sense, inevitable—as predictable as flamboyant Gothic. Allow me to express my observation in a simple phrase: the poetry I referred to is specializing itself away from the animality of man, becoming formal to the extreme. It does not appeal, nor does it intend to appeal, to the passions of pity, love, sadness, fear,/anger, or joy. It is a triumph of words whose meanings are veiled as too pedestrian. "Do not try to find out what the poet means", we are told,"but just lobk at what he does!" You can see why it would take another poet to appreciate that. There is a law of natural evolution which we might couch in the following words: natural organism tend to become so specialized that they can no longer progress nor survive the adversities of nature. They reach a dead-end. Man differs from other animals by his lack of specialization. Attend to our hands and to our mouths and to our nakedness. It is thanks to reason that we can manage and compensate for this lack of specialization. In fact, without this lack, our reason would be inoperative nor would there be a reason to have reason at all. My point at this juncture is that on the strictly human plane, we may be refining and specializing ourselves out of existence, to paraphrase James ^oyce. We are withdrawing into the unnatural recesses of mind, 'all passion spent.' Yet there is at this same time another form of poetic which does not appeal to a reason ever more refined; it has not forgotten the animal, but does turn its back on the 'human'. Perhaps I should qualify this. It appeals to the animality of man inasmuch as this animality can be distinctively much loiter than that of the beast. This we find in the novel that explores human concupiscence and lust with physical, unpoetic impact; or in the kind of popular music that agitates the chemistry of the human and drives him to contortions that are visually sordid and which this same human would not dare look upon in the most lustful of the beasts. Returning to our novel, I mean that it deals mainly with man's life of unruly concupiscence and even the irascibility of man is seen as relevant only inasmuch as he struggles to maintain or achieve a life of lust. "But that is the way things are" we are told. And of course it is, and vias always known to be so. Mind you, I do not refer to the cheap pornographic novel. I have in mind works which do not aim to titillate our easily aroused concupisclence but which in fact cannot 'achieve their ends without doing so much as if we had reached a stage where the sordidness of man had become the middle to the end, an end without hope. Even the heroes of classic tragedy were spared such an exit. This is not unrelated to the contention of some that artist, to describe our repulsive selves in an appealing way, must have personal experience of whatever he deals with; and that even the evil of commission is redeemed by poetic transposition. We are left to understand, and some in fact so do understand it, that no one could write intelligently about evil without the personal experience of comitting evil.

This is a very interesting novelty from the viewpoint of literary criticism. First it is no doubt a novel thesis. As a general statement it is utterly absurd. It displays all too tellingly a lack of poetic imagination. The true poet can understand and convey in a pleasing way how a murderer feels without having the experience of comitting murder. The same for all human vices — except those that are utterly against nature.

The question is: must one have the experience of committing evil to know what evil is? How do we know evil? --Speculatively: as we define it. --Morally:--in a formal way. The moral theologian and the poet have an amazing knowledge of evil of evil which does not in the least presuppose commission on their part. In fact, their knowledge will be profound in the measure that they are detached. Intus existence prohibet extraneum. You cannot see with your finger stuck in your eye. A jaundiced eye sees, but imperfectly. No one knows evil as thoroughly as God does. How can this be. Known in knower according to the mode of the knower. In this sense it is good to know evil. Essential ingredient of a good universe. There is, finally, another way of knowing evil: the knowledge one has in the experience of commission. But the interesting aspect of this knowledge is that it is incommunicable, as incommunicable as one's" own individual action. Although this knowledge is incommunibale, there can be communication about it among those who share the same action. (Compare to sensation: qomo incomm., qomo communication about it.) In short, if there is to be communication about evil in this order, they who communicate must share the same, kind of knowledge. better it But the poet has his vengeance without that knowledge, and the (Some years ago Franz Werfel wrote a book of essays entitled Theologoumena......"..This just another variant of the same idea.)

That was our first point, a general one. The second is more specific. We all know that the experience of evil appealed to as an indispensible ingredient of the poetic person, has little to do with justice of injustice, fortitude or cowardice, but very specifically with incontinence or intemperance. (I distinguish these two.) The object of temperance is...Tactual pleasure, even when utterly sane and moderate, are of the lowest kind. We have them in common with the beasts who live for none other. When they man they dominate his whole life, he becomes lower than the beast. (When ±H in this predicament, he is too dull to know it. He has, so to speak, to be forced under the shower.) The other day I saw on television a group of children in kindergarten doing the twist. The spectators thought them cute. I am afraid that many would condemn my taste as I judge such spectacles both degrading and ridiculous. Do not misunderstand. I am not at all a pessimist, not even a mild grouch. The Christian conception of depravity perversity is at bottom an optimistic one. If God lets the world somber in what appears to be hopeless confusion, this must be interpreted as a sign of his high designs, for...

Meantime we must heed St. Paul: let us not understand that because God turns evil to the good, we ought to say: faciamus malum ut eveniat bonum. Our Lord Himself told us the last word on the subject: Scandal there must be, hut woe to him through whom it comes about.

Ni la connaissance de la loi naturelle, ou syndérèse, ni même les conclusions de la science morale, ne sauraient jamais constituer à elles seules la règle prochaine et efficace de notre conduite; elles servent tout au plus de règle commune et éloignée, encore que nécessaire absolument. La raison en est leur caractère, abstrait et universel, alors que l'agir humain est fait d'actions singulières contingentes. Il est Si-ns doute vrai que les préceptes premiers et par exemple, très communs de la loi naturelie/sont absolument certains et connus de tous, mais seulement in universali; et à cause précisément de leur très grande universalité et abstraction du singulier, ils sont par contre tout ce qu'il y a de plus indéterminé et et incertain comme règle de 1'agere hic et nunc, et partant de moins apte à le diriger comme il convient dans ce qu'il a de singulier et de contingent. les préceptes secondaires de la loi naturelle, parce que moins abstraits et universels que les premiers, sont moins certains in universali (verum habent solum ut in pluribus) , cependant ils constituent une règle d'action plus déterminée et plus efficace eu égard aux opérations singulières contingentes; et davantage encore les conclusions plus particulières de la science morale. C'est ce qui fait dire à Aristotelis ïïth.II , 0.7; s.Th., lect.viii, nn.333-34.-I-II, q.77, a.2, ad lia).

Raison de tout cela: les actions-humaines sont singulières, et seule une connaissance singulière peut être immédiatement proportionnée, et partant servir la connaissance de la loi naturelle, d'une part, et de la science morale, d'autre part, ne pourrait jamais constituer la-règle prochaine de notre conduite. Le fait de savoir sans erreur possible que dans toutes les circonstances de la vie nous devons faire le bien et éviter le mal n'implique pas la vérité du jugement sur ce qui est bien ou mal hic et nunc. Cette indétermination où nous laissa la connaissance de la loi naturelle ne provient pas uniquement de l'incertitude où nous pouvons nous trouver touchant certaines déterminations particulières de cette loi, ou les propositions qu'on en peut obtenir par manière de conclusions. Quand même,en plus des principes généraux de la loi naturelle, saisis avec grande certitude, nous avions une connaissance suffisante de ses principes plus particuliers, tel le précepte »11 faut rendre le dépôt,' nous n'aurions pas encore ce qu'il faut pour savoir quoi faire hic et nunc. La pratique de la justice demande que l'agent tienne compte des circonstances de l'action,lesquelles sont variables dans un cas particulier, la remise du dépôt pourrait être une injustice — si, par exemple, le créancier le réclame pour financer une attaque contre la patrie.

Il en est encore de même potu les sciences morales, telles l'éthique et la politique. Ces sciences pratiques s'appliquent à déterminer les moyens qui sont le plus souvent valables pour l'acquisition de la vertu,...en.quoi s'accomplit la loi naturelle. Ce genre de science, en effet, "ne vise pas à' déterminer la nature de la vertu, mais le moyen à employer pour devenir vertueux, faute de quoi son utilité serait nulle." Cependant, même la seule connaissance de ces moyens ne fait pas l'homme de bienj elle ne permet pas de savoir,- à elle seule, comment agir hic et nunc. Elle rectifie sans doute l'intelligence dans la ligne du savoir pratique, mais ne rectifie pas pour autant l'appétit. La science morale, en effet, réside dans la seule raison (in sola ratione), tandis que la prudence, vertu architec-tonique de 1 action, a quelque chose dans l'appétit. Or, celui-ci peut être plus ou moins droit. Et nous voici en face de la plus grande difficulté de 11 action droite : la vérité du jugement prudentiel, de la décision de faire ce qui est à faire hic et nunc, ne consiste pas dans la conformité de l'intelligence avec ce qui est; elle dépend essentiellement de la con-

(1) - Ethique à Nicomaque, II, 2, 1103b25. (2) - S. Ohomas, In VI Ethicor., lect. 7, n. 1200 ; "...Prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu. Omnia ergo de quibus hic fit mentio, intantum sunt species prudentiae, inquantum non in ratione sola consistunt, sed habent aliquid in appetitu. Inquantum enim sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quaedam scientiae practicae, scilicet ethica oeconomica et politica." formitê de l'intelligence avec l'appétit rectifié. Du reste, la vérité spédulative concernant toutes les circonstances de l'action est impossible; elle ne peut porter que sur ce qui arrive le plus souvent. Cette connaissance spéculative des circonstances est suffisante pour l'action, mais ne suffit pas pour garantir la vérité pru-"dentielle. Celle-ci dépend de la disposition de l'appétit : veut-on faire le bien, hic et nunc, tel qu'il doit être voulu ? Un homme peut savoir que l'on doit boire avec mesure, qu'il a coutume de boire à l'excès, que le moyen d'acquérir la vertu de sobriété est de s'abstenir que pour être raisonnable il devrait, lui, s'abstenir hic et nunc; tout cela ne l'empêche pas de décider à"commettre encore un excès. Malgré toute sa connaissance, son jugement prudential est faux, et d'est l'appétit concupiscible immodéré qui l'incline à porter ce jugement.

Plus encore dans les temps modernes que dans l'antiquité, des philosophes ont tenté de' contourner surtout cette dernière difficulté de l'action droite, soit au moyen de la seule science, soit au moyen de l'art : moyens dont la connaissance et l'application devraient, d'une manière automatique, nous faire agir tel que la raison le demande. Aristote était d'un tout autre avis. Pour lui, comme pour saint Thomas, la science morale seule est peu utile à la vertu, tandis que le cas des arts est tout autre que celui des vertus. ...Le cas des arts n'est pas semblable à celui des vertus, car les oeuvres de l'art ont leur bonté en elles-mêmes, en sorte qu'il leur suffit d'être en elles-mêmes telles qu'elles doivent être. Mais dans le cas des vertus il ne suffit pas que les choses que l'on fait soient justes ou tempérées. Encore faut-il que l'agent agisse de la manière dont il doit agir.

Il faut, en premier lieu, qu'il agisse avec connaissance; ensuite que son acte provienne d'un choix fait en vue de cet acte lui-même; en troisième lieu que son action procède d'une disposition ferme et immuable. Ces conditions n'entrent pas en ligne de compte dans le cas des arts, sauf la connaissance. Mais dans le cas des vertus, la connaissance n'a que peu d'importance ou même n'en a pas du tout, tandis que les autres conditions ne sont nullement négligeables. Que dis-je ? Elles comptent pour tout, puisqu'elles ne s'obtiennent que par la pratique continue de ce qui est juste et de ce qui est tempérant. Or, on qualifie les actions de justes et de ttempérées, quand elles sont telles que les accomplirait un homme juste et tempérant." En revanche, est juste et tempérant non pas celgi qui fait ces choses, mais celui qui les fait de la manière dont les justes et les tempérants exécutent ces actions. [Car on pourrait faire comme les personnes tempérantes quand il n'y a pas assez à boire ou à manger.] On a donc raison de dire que c'est en posant des actes de justice que l'homme devient juste, et en posant des actes de tempérance que l'homme devient tempérant. Faute de cette pratique, nul ne deviendra homme de bien. Mais la plupart des gens ne se donnent pas cette peine et, se réfugiant dans l'argumentation, croient, pouvoir devenir d'honnêtes gens en faisant de la philosophie [des vertus], semblables en quelque sorte à ces malades qui, prêtant avec soin l'oreille aux prescriptions des médecins, ne se conforment pas à l'ordonnance. Et de même que ces derniers, ne retrouveront pas la santé en soignant leur corps de la sorte, de même les autres ne guériront pas non plus leur âme en philosophant de cette manière. (1)

(1; - Ethique à Nicomaquè, II, h, 110*-b2o.) — S. Thomas se fait sien cet enseignement, dans la Q. D. de Virtutibus in Communi, a. 6, ad 1 : "...Prudentia plus importat quam scientia practica : nam ad scientiam practicam pertinet universale judicium de agendis; sicut fornicationem esse malam, furtum non esse faciendum, et huiusmodi. Qua quidem scientia existente, in particulari actu contingit judicium rationis intercipi, ut non .recte dijudicet; et propter hoc dicitur parum valere ad virtutem, quia ea existente contingit hominem contra virtutem peccare. Sed ad prudentiam pertinet recte judicare de singulis agibilibus, prout sunt nunc agenda : quod quidem judicium corrumpitur per quodlibet peccatum. Et ideo prudentia manente, homo non peccat : unde ipsa non parum sed multum confert ad virùttem; immo ipsam virtutem causat..."

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