Folder 11 part 2
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[edit] Folder 11, Part 2
Various Conferences
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Sacraments pp. 1-21.
Process 23-24
Teleological Mechanisms 32-42
43-62 Trinitarian Theology
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See correspondence: Cyrias Ouellet Teleological mechanisms (pages 34-42) . N. Wiener, W. S. McCulloch The purpose of the articles by Wiener and McCulloch is to establish the possibility of understanding "purposeful" behavior in human beings in terms of control mechanisms found in instruments of communication. The general principle exemplified in such mechanisms is the control of effective input by the desired output. This control is established, first of all, by a closed circuit, or one in vhich there is the possibility of mutuel influence of the input and output stages. secondly, there mut exist a "feedback", which is a transfer of power from the output stage to the input stage. T he feedback will be negative, which means that it buts do' n effective input. It v ill vary in intensity with the power received by the output stage. As input varies, so the feedback varies. By this means, the effective input, or that actually received by the section leading directly to the output, is stabilized, and the desired output achieved. This principle is applied to man and his actions. wiener raites: "Feedback is vital to all voluntary activity. `;;hen .I pich up an object I never knot: :hat muscular contraction will effect my end. Hov do I regulate my motion and ;shy does it succeed? In each stage, I regulate my motion by the amount by zhich my task is not yet accomplished. I monitor the extent to which I have completed my task in part visually, but also, to a considerable extent, kinisthetically. There are, in each muscle, sensory end-organs like strain guages which report to the nervous system the stretch or rate of stretch to which the muscle is subjected." in this example offered by ='.iener, the sensory end-organs would correspond to the output stage. power is tapped off them and fed back to the nervous system, v.hich vNould be the input stage.. The nervous system then maintains, increases or decreases the power relayed to the muscles doing the work. Thus the desired output is effectuated. supplementing the notion of feedback taken from the field of communication is the factor of discrimination found in calculating instruments. contingent upon the message received by the calculator, various circuits of the mechanism till be brought into operation. As applied to the human being, this factor of discrimination accounts for the versatility in action apparent in his action and lacking in simple instruments of communication. In keeping ith the similarities posited betv:een the human being and the instruments of communication and calculation, the responses of the human being to external stiniùli (to the messages received in ips "coupling" with the y:orld of perception) are held to be determined. Further, as in the case of the instruments, the rules of human action are, allov.ing for the original structure of the hum n organism, held to be imposed upon man from without, through the medium of ense experience. This will be seen shortly. Of course, the apparent differences betl`.een such instruments and the human being are admitted. The most striking concerns freedom of action, seemingly manifest in the case of man and utterly 3 1
lacking in the case of the machine. on this score, vAener writes: "The artificial machine is generally presented to us with all the rules of its operation explicitly stated ,whereas the machine of the human being is very greatly conditioned by its own past experience and is kno,.n to ups only as a class of machines rather than as e certain specific machine. It may seem, therefore-, that logiccl theory leaves the human m: chine freer than the artificial machine, so th,t ;hile the artificial machina as one fixed logic of its o',n, man may wander through all logics. I think this view is false. The human machine in any particular case and in any particular situation, has a determined logic, but we do not know precisely what it is." wiener makes mention of the conditioning of present behavior by past experience. Here, we have a second extremely important difference between the human being and the machine. The principles of human behavior (the "logics" of wiener) vary, but those of the machine do not. The process involving change of principles is learning, and it is limited to man. In connection with the relation between the variety of the principles of behavior and freedom of action, an analysis of the process of learning is necessary. wiener limited himself to the expression of disbelief in the legitimacy of the leap from learning to freedom. ricCulloch offers an interesting hypothesis in support of this disbelief. Icculloch writes: "Nov let us turn back to Cajol's theory of learning and suppose that, in the growing nervous system, cells used together become associated in structure. In our initially somewhat chaotic nervous system, almost everything might be con- 4 nected to almost everything else, clearly, there must be competition between nervous cells for footspace on their followers. There, at least, priority in time might determine which would succeed and be perpetuated, but it-is to be faced that this is not enough. confronted with a new problem, behavior may be initially random, but once success is achieved, the successful mode of behavior becomes the"prefërred mode, and ultimately the fixed mode, of behavior. This, in substance, is Thorndykets law of effect. The question is simply how this can be accounted for in terms of what would fix the connections of cells. Must we invoke impulses from some remote structure whose activity corresponds to its sense of satisfaction, or can we look locally to the relations of one cell to another. I believe the latter is the case, although as yet I see no way to prove it. We will invoke what may be called a setting-in process. It will be recalled that, if an exter- nal magnetic field is applied to a lump of iron, the little magnets scattered within in are compelled to assume new positions and, if they are subjected to a serieu of such forces, the strength and duration of these forces will, to a certain extent, determine their organization. The most significant thing by far will, however, be that force which last;;put a given magnet into position before the force disappeared. our setting-in process is similar to this. The activity itself disappears when the problem is solved, and it leaves the cells to continued growing along the last pattern enforced by the activity. tr Thus the impress of an activity determined by the logic of the situation and the logic of the human machine remains, and the machine is' left to respond to a related situation in a somewhat diverse but equally determined fashion. Perhaps, by a happy development in the growth of the cells, new ideas may arise and, by a repetition of the "setting-in" process, lead to endless progeny. c. jY704-1.A. GO-u.A.52-
There is a capital disjunction to be made between !logical form' and 'artificial form.' The former was possibly one of the nuances of 'logos.' To point out this distinction we may refer to St.Paul's definition of Faith in Hebr.xi,l. It makes one wonder, for it appears to be a bad fiefinition,but it is not: # substnntia rerum sperandarum,argumentum non apparentium." Now Faith is a quality,not a substance, and should be rather considered,defined,as an habitus, a virtus;moreover argumentum refers rather to reason. But St.Thomas explains,in de Verit.,q.14,a.2:"Videtur autem potius esse dicendum quod haec fides notificatioE sit completissima ejus definitio: non ita quod sit secundum debitam formam definitionis tradita,sed quia in ea smftetextar sufficienter tVATONNICIlx tanguntur omnia quae exiguuntur ad fides definitionem. Quandoque enim fp#ksr ipsis philosophis sufficit tangere principia syllogismorum et definitionum, s quibus habitis,non est difficile in format reducere secundum artis doctrinam..." In other words,that definition lacks only something purely ' accidenttal' The artificial form man merely explicitates what is contained in the definition. In IIa Ilae,q.4,a.1,c.,St.Thomas says about that same definition of faith:"licet quidam dicant praedicta Apostoli verba non esse fidei definitionem,tamen,si quis recte consideret,omnia ex quibus fides potest definiri in praedicta descriptione tanguntur,licet verba non ordinentur sub forma definitionis: sicut etiam apud philosophos NiIIsAIgot 3° rWutix+ni izutwe `aurad agwk aurad nick p3 BRoaamittft praetermissa syllogistica forma syllogismorum principia tanguntur." St.Thomas himself,following Aristotle,will often put the minor premiss of a syllogism before the major premiss. He could,in such a case,convert it into an artificial form, that is,put it in an order that is really ' accident&l.1 Still, though he does not do this,he retains a logical form,but one that differs from the articial form. In Ad ftebraaos, c.11.lect.l,he remarks:"Deftnitionem fidei ponit complete quidem, sed obscure." Next we may oppose artifacts such as words and tables, to the work whose form is pnperly logical. This 'opus' differs almost beyond recognition from the former cases. It is at this stage that we are faced with the familiar distinction between grammar and logic. Both are concerned with the word,yet from totally distinct angles. Grammar considers the word inasmuch as it flows from man's practical intellett,viz. qua artificial sign.(Cf.de Verit.,q.4,a.1) This is the formal subject of grammar. Hence it is that grammatical definitions should be constructed in terms of 'art,' for the mode of defining depends on the very subject. Grammar will not define the word 9,1111 sign. It will say that the noun, for instance,signifies per modum substantiae:for though'colour' does not signify a substance,it signifies colour in the mode of a substance; similarly the adjective is what signifies per modum accidentis,namely for the grammarian. But to the logician,'rational',though grammatically an adjective, signifies essential,intrinsic,difference of the very substance itself. Now,words signify concepts,which is the reason logic is concerned with words. For there is an "ordo quem ratio r facit in proprio actu,puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem,et signa conceptuum,quia sunt voces significativae." (In I Ethtcor.,lect.l,n.2) Accordingly logic needs those artificial,external forms: words and then their exterior disposition,as it were. At this juncture we are faced with a danger,and this is to wwwt 3vi resolve into artificial forms in the way the grammarian does,such as to be satisfied with a certain spacial disposition,such as figures,modes,etc. The* artificial of grammar forms/are meant to dispose us with a view to the properly logical form;whereas the resolution that is proper to logic is one that bears upon,or rather analyses,ux divides or reduces to logical intentions,and not to the purely articial form. The logician should be able to perceive within the order of words an order that does not concern the grammarian and that rightly escapes him: this order is invisible to grammar because far more intelligible. Thus St.Thomas says that ummi anxxx t "quaedam invisibilia Bunt, quorum quidditas et natura perfecte exprimitur ex quidditattbus rerum sensibilium notis,et de talibus intelligibilibus possumus scire quid est, sed mediate,sicut ex hoc quod scitur quid est homo et quid est animal,sufficienter innotescit habitudo unius ad alterum, et ex hoc scitur quid est genus et quid est species."(De ~t~c Trin.,q.6,a.3;or lect.ii,ii,a.3 ??) These 'intelligibilia'or tinvisibilia' are Aw of course second intentions. Referring now to the distinctions made in De Trin.,q.6, a.2,we start"ex apprhensionë sensas.Sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter(meaning:it is not always the same): quandoque enim est in sensu,quandoque in imaginatione,quandoque in solo intellectu." It is this. latter term that logic shares with metaphysics. Hence,to'judge' according to sense or imagination in logic is all wrong.. "Deduci autem ad aliquid est ad aliud terminare",and error would ensue if we were to "deduckmn ad sensum" in logic,as we should do in philosophy of nature. Similarly there is a danger mfR adaeizadxsEniumi imxïagie of "deduci ad formam articialem" in logic,that is, to judge according to the external form. In this case the definition of Faith given by St.Paul would be misjudged:we it would betray a wrong understanding of that intentional thing: definition. The danger is very real since the two forms,artificial and logical,are in fact closely intertwined. So long as ouuminds have not surmounted that peril by dint of a certain type of abstraction that makes logic so difficult,so long as we have not learned to deduce into logical intentions,we are unable to understand what logic is about and how it proceeds. Nor should we ever resort to "deduci ad ipsum nomen." There are examples of this confusion in the case of relative .names(Vd.Ia,q.13,a.7),in that of the word 'genus'. These must be viewed in their contexts. Genus is seen as a predicable in the lsagoge and as a predicate in the RIumick Topics,and these are different sec ond intentions.4the word 'subject' in the Perihermeneias,which is there sometimes considered in relation to predicate,sometimes in relation to propria passio; then again in the Priora. In other words,different acts of reason offer totally distinct second intentions, so that knowledge of these requires knowledge of those. Two important texts relating to this subject are: Meta.V,lect.7,n.848; and Ia,q.16,a.6.(CajetRan all wrong here). Logic apparently participates in the three modes of De Trin.,q.6,a 3,:though principally in that of "etaph.: 'intelligibiliter.' Logic always goes to the 'quid' and it enjoys more certitude than metaphysics insofar as it possible to reach,in logic,such a quid . More certitude too than philsophy of nature because the second intention is something necessary and immutable. It-further participates in the mode of pgilosophy of nature inasmuch as the second intentions can be reached only via those sensible signs,words.But these are only principles,not terms!
De Trinitate (pages 61-62) Plan of the Treatise 1. Cum de Trinitate ioquimura, cum cautela et modedtia est agendum.(Ia,31,2,c.) De analogia in phil. et in S.Hoctriit,ct. 2. Tractatus in tres partesCuWw-r,~L. I. De its quae se habent ut praecognita et praesupposita ad distinctionem personarum. QQ.27 & 28. (a) De processionibus tamquam fundaments relationum ad intra,in quibus Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur. (Q.27) Primo,de processione quae in Deo invenir i potest, scLsecundum emanationem intelligibilem,utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente,quod verbum manet in agente.(a.l.-Cf. In Joann.i; C.G.IV,il) Secundo, de processione quae est generatio in quarto modo d cendi per se. (Gebmaatio ut nat&vitas,quae primo natura. Inde foezunditas.)(a.2.) Tertio,alia processio amoris,secundum quam amatum est in amante^ txxxzkix prius similitudine et pondere, deinde. ut° possessum per modum- inhaesionis appetitus in bono. Et ad istam terminatur processio ad antra secundum intelligibilem emarftionem. (a.3) Quarto: processio amoris non est generatio,quia non completur in ipsa similitudine,quae se habent per modum principii processionis quae est per modum impAB ionis et impllentis.(Non habet specmiale nomen. Tamen 'Spiratio~"tamquam advenientis spiritus vehementis.\') (a.4) Quinto: Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur uno verbo et uno amore--secundum duas operationes immanentes, quae solae Deo convenire possunt. (b) De ipsis relationibus divinis,quae secundum processiones accipiuntur,et reales Bunt. Q.28. Primo: IRelatio' diversimode accipitur,et est terminus analogus. Relationes quae fundantur in processionibus ipsae reales sunt.(a.l) N.B. Sunt quatuor oppositiones. Sola oppositio 'relatic in Deo salvari potest,eo quod termini ejus non tollunt aliquid per modum negationis--ut jam patet in relatio- nibus paternitatis et filiationis. Et quia talas oppo- sitio non facit divisionem in esse sed in respectu, in Deo inveniri potent.. (+a.2) r uo,~y{Rstoz/tcrw tG Lt(6.Yb "~ • ~o, "kixs-w .rage cûi arst...ha „D 1,dGAc cccsu aces 7rr r70 ,.s °-=-i4r et sunt reales et distinctae,quia quamvis 1 ;> non fundentur super extrems, secundum se distincta, sed super illud quod distinctionem facit,scil.origo t seu processio, quae extrema et respectus producit. Origo aute est communicativa naturae,non divisiva. (N.B. A.v.,in God,there can be'°distinct terms prior to the relations,between which terms the relation would. occur. For whatever,in God,precedes relationship, is absolute,not distinct,and wholly one. Hence it is • • that only procession and originiation can found real relations that do not require extremes distinct and prior to these relations,whereas these in fact give rise to the extremes that are found in God. (The relations,in effect,are substantial,not acciddntal» (a.3) Quarto: there are four such relations in God. II. De Ipsis Personis secundum se. (a) Id quod est commune omnibus personis. • Primo: quid sit persona.(Q.29) Secundo:divisio seu pluralitas Personarum(q.30). Tertio: ea quae pluralitatem consequuntur et quomodo circa istam nominibus utendum q.31). Quarto: cognoscibilitas Personarum,et consequenter earum nominatio et discretio,quod fie per notiones (q.32). (b) De singulis Personis. Primo: de Persona Patris (q.33). Secundo: de Persona Filii quantum ad rationem et munus Verbi (q.34). Tertio: de Filio ut Imago (q.35). Quarto: De Persona Spiritus Sancti quantum a rationem n Spiritus (q.3r Quinto: turn sum%do 'spiritumt ut dicit impulsum et efficaciam voluntatis procedentem a Patre et Filio spirantibus;tum ut dilectio seu amor Spiritus (q.37). Sexto: de S.Spiritu inquaTeum est donum procedens et emissum a donante (q.38). III. Quinque comparationes Personaa:rum. Primo:in ordine ad essentiam quae illis terminatur, et ad nomina essentialia quibus significatur(g.39),' Secundo: Comparantur Personae ad relationes,quibus ut formis personalibus constituuntur Personae( q.40) Tertio:comparantur ad actus notionales secundum quos originantur Personae,vel prnducunt(q.L..l) . Quarto: Comparantur Personae inter se quantum ad aequalitatem,magnitudinem,coaeternitatem et similia (q.4.2) . Quinto,comparantur quoad creaturas ad quas mittuntur —'~ersonaero opera aliquo sanctification~s,in ~ubo tvânt v~n iâri~mâ er ap~pare~t er~~ S~a~R, .(724. ~~b9 per anc if~ca neem vis. PLAN OP THE TREATISE —ÙÉ !ÆIFATE 1. Cum de Trinita4loquimur, oum cautela et modestia est agendum. (Ia,31,2,o.) De analogia in phil, at in S.Doctrina. 2. Tr  atus in tree partes dividitur: I. De its quae se habent tar praeoognita et praesuppoâita ad distinctionem personarum. QQ. 27 & 28. (a) De proceesionibue tamquam fundamenta relationum ad intra, in quibus Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur. (Q.27) Primo, de procession. qua. in Deo inveniri potest, aecundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod verbum manet in agente. (a.I.-Cf. In Joann.I; C.G. IV, 11). Secundo, de processione quae est g eneratio in quarto modo dicendi per se. (Generatio ut nativitas, qua. primo nature dicitur. Inde foecunditas.) (a.2) Tertio, alla proceasio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante prius sincilitudine et ponder., deinde ut poaseseum per modum inhaeaionis appetitus in bono. Et ad istam terminatur proceasio ad intra seouidum intelligibilem emanationem. (a.3) Quarto, processio_ auroras non est generatio, quia non oompletur in ipsa similitudine, quae se habet per modum principii processionis quae est per modum impulsionis et impellentia. (non habet special. nomen. Tamen 'Spiratiol -- "Tamquam advenientis epiritus vehementia".) (a.L) Quuinto, Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur uno verbõ-et uno amore -- aecundum ducs operationes immanentes, quae solae Deo convenir. posaunt. (b)De ipsis relationibue divinis, quae secundum processiones aocipiuntur, et realea aunt. Q. 28. Primo: 'Relatio' diversimode aocipitur, et est terminus ana ogus. Relationes quae fundantur in procesaionibus ipsae reales aunt. (a.l). N.B. Sunt quator oppositiones. Sole oppositio relationia !eo salvari potest, eo quod termini ejus non tollunt aliquid per modum negationis -- ut jam patet in relatio- nibus paternitatis•et filiationis. Et quia tells oppo- sitio non facit divisionem in esse sed in respectu, in Deo inveniri potest. (a.2) Secundo: relatio in Deo idem est, cum sua essentia, (eo moportionaliter, aotio est idem cum motu). Tertio: et aunt reales et distinotae, quia quamvia non fundantur super extrema aecundum se distincte, sed super illud quod distinctionem tacit, scil. origo seu, processio, quae extrema et respectus producit. Origo autan est communicative naturae, non divisive. N B. A.v. in God, there can be no distinct terms prior t`o the relations, between which terms the relation would occur. i' or whatever, in God, precedes relationship is absolute, not distinct, and wholly one. H ence it is that only procession and origination can found real relations that do not require extremes distinct and prior to these relations, whereas these in faot give rise to the extremes that are found in God. (The relations, in effedt, are su?-s'santial, not ' accidental. (a.3). - 2 —
Plan of the Treatise Do Trinitate Quarto: There are no sucn,relationa in God. II. De Ipsia Personis secundum se. (a) Id quod est commune omnibus personis. Primo: Quid est persona. (Q.29) SecundotDivisio sou pluralitas Personarum (Q.30). Tertiot ea quae pluralitatem conaequuntur et quomodo circa istam nominibus utendum sit. (Q.31) Quarto: cognoscibilitas Personarum, et consequenter earum nominatio et diacretio, quod fit per notioniea. (Q.32) (b) De Singulis Personis. Primo: De Person a Patrie (Q.33) Secundo: de Persona Filii quantum ad rationem et munus Verbi (Q.34) Tertic; de' Filio ut Imago (Q.35). ,uar ro: Do Parscna Spiritus Sancti quantum a ra;ionom Spiritus (Q.36). plaint:: Tum sumendo ISpi.•itum+ ut dioit impulsum et efficacism voluntatis procedentam a Patre et Filio spirantibus; tum ut dileotio seu amor Spiritus (Q.37) Sexto: de S. Spiritu inquantum est donum procedens et emissum a donante (Q.38). III. Quinqua comparationes Personarum. Frimo: in ordine ad essentiam quae illis terminatur et ad nimina essentialia quibus significantur (Q.39) Sgounno; Comparantur Personae ad relationes, quibus ut formic personalibus constituuntur Personae (Q.40). Tertio: comparantur ad actus notionales aecundum quoa originantur Personae, vel producunt (q.41) Quarto: Comparantur Personae inter se quantum ad aequalitatem, magnitudinem, coaeternitatem, et similia (Q.42) Quinto: comparantur quoad creaturas ad quas mittuntur Personae pro opera aliquo sanotificationis, in quo vel visibiliter apparent personae, vel invisibiliter habitant in anima per canotificationem (Q.43) .