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Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments It seems that apart from its value as witness to the spirit of the time, the importance of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)1. should have been enhanced by the fame of his later Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), since it is in the prior work that he faced the more fundamental problems' of ethics. Only in recent times has the relation between his ethical and economic theories begun to receive due attention.2 Our aim is however a restricted one. Because Smith's Theory is apparently characterized by emphasis on Sentiment, and since Aristotle and Saint Thomas had stressed the role of appetite in practical truth, one might be inclined to view it as a reaction against the extreme rationalism of his time and a return to a more traditional conception of the practical life. Indeed it was, and many of his observations are quite consonant with those of the authors just' mentioned. Our purpose is to show that in reality the ethics of Adam Smith does not quite succeed in divorcing. itself from the rationalist conception of morality which he aimed to replace. By rationalism, when extended to human actions, we mean the theory which confines practical truth to reason in such a manner that sheer knowledge must provide the ultimate norm of individual conduct. In Book VI of the Ethics, chapter 2, Aristotle defines practical truth by the conformity of reason, not with what is absolutely, but with right appetite. " What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire ; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical ; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual) ; while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire." a This means that while truth is formally in the intellect, the truth of what one does depends_ nevertheless upon the dis- 1. We have used the edition entitled : Essays on Moral Sentiments, etc., London, Alex. Murray and Son, 1869. — The most authoritative biography of Adam Smith is that of John RAE, Life of Adam Smith, London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1895. 2. Glenn R. MORROW, The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith, Cornell Studies in Philosophy No.13, New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1923. 3. In Book VI of the Ethics, ch 2. position of the appetite with respect to the end.' In other words, the truth of fully practical knowledge consists, not in knowledge alone, but in the very act of directing toward an end in conformity with a principle that is appetite. And therein lies the difficulty of right action. • It is precisely this difficulty which so many philosophers have tried to side-step by inventing a. moral " system " that in the end would be adequate to the contingent situations of life and ensure the rightness of our actions no matter what the temper of our desires — a moral science which would dispense with prudence as a distinct intellectual virtue."- There is a further distinction to be• borne in mind before we examine Smith's theory. Moral virtues are acquired. How, then, can a person act according to virtue before it is acquired ? In this respect all men are largely subject to contingency. However, it is known from experience that if a young person is reared in the proper surroundings, by people who are themselves virtuous and who, by example, instruction and discipline, train that young person to learn and do what is right and avoid what is wrong, such a person has a chance of becoming virtuous and so achieve happiness. In other words, the particular norms of human behavior are first extrinsic, embodied in customs, regulations, literature, and the person of our -neighbour. These norms may be right or wrong, in whole or in part. What, then, is the. criterion ? There's the rub. Whatever doctrine moral philosophy may be, it will differ widely, not only from the mathematical, but also from the natural sciences. It will require a vast amount of experience as recorded by persons whom we consider to be wise in such matters. That one must do what is right and avoid the wrong is known to every responsible agent. But this does not take one very far. Besicles, just when is an agent responsible? The greatest of ancient philosophers realized, uncommonly, that moral knowledge and the achievement of virtue are matters which cannot be settled. by abstract reasoning, as one can see in Plato's 1. In his commentary on the above-quoted passage, Saint Thomas raises an obvious difficulty and answers it, in the following terms : " Videtur auteur hic esse quoddam dubium. Nam si veritas intellectus practici determinatur in comparatione ad appetitum rectum, appetitus auteur rectitudo determinatur per hoc quod consonat rationi verae, ut pries dictum est, sequitur quaedam circulatio in dictis determinationibus. Et ideo dicendum a t, quod appetitus est finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem : finis auteur determinatus est hotrini a natura, ut scilicet in tertio habitum est. Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non sunt nods determinata a natura; sed per rationem investiganda. Sic ergo manifestum est, quod rectitudo appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica. Et secundum hoc determinatur veritas rationis practicae secundum concordiam ad appetitum rectum. Ipsa autem veritas rationis practicae est regela rectirudinis appetitus, circa ea clime sunt ad finem. Et ideo secundum hoc dicitur appetitus rectus, qui prosequitur quae Vera ratio dicit. " In VI Ethicorum, lect.2, (ed. Pirotta) n.1131. 2. Cf. Charles DE KONLVCK, La révolte contre la vérité prudeatielle, Semaines sociales du Canada, LNe session, Montréal, 1943, pp.109-121. 101 102 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE Laws and Aristotle's Ethics. According to the latter, the study of virtuous activity, let alone the acquisition of virtue itself (in no way per se produced by ethics), is far less a matter of knowledge than his master had thought. The human condition being what it is, no wonder the Age of Enlightenment became impatient with the problems that any man or society has to face in point of right and wrong. It is difficult for us to realize nowadays the extent to which an utterly fictitious clarity held the intellectuals in bondage since the Renaissance. It all appears to have begun with an optimistic humanism, of which Pico della Mirandola is a fine example. But even this is seen to have been preceded by the Latin variety of Averroism — a dualism Which left man free sway. At any rate, it was Descartes who,expressed the shape of the spirit of his times. He reminds us of what Aristotle said in Book II of the Metaphysics " Thus some people do not listen to a speaker unless he speaks mathematically . . ." Descartes was an outstanding mathematician, even though he speaks of mathematics with disdain. But he did not underestimate the power of this discipline when applied to the study of nature. On the other hand, even when he philosophizes in a more general way, he expects one to do so with a lucidity quite like that one finds in mathematics. This is plain in his assumption that what is most knowable in itself must be equated with what is most knowable to us — which is indeed the case of mathematics whose subjects we ourselves construct. To put it another way : he identified the certainty of fact, the an est of a thing, with exact knowledge of what the thing is ; the quid nominis with the quid rei. Of course we are quite certain that there is motion, but this does not mean that we know plainly and exactly what motion is. The Cartesian idées claires et distinctes are without exception characterized by hopeless confusion. -Meantime, people felt good about this way of thinking. The real world was believed to be utterly proportioned to the human intellect, inasmuch as it was conceived as a vast though intricate machinery. Even human bodies achieved dubious clarity by being just machines in the way of clocks. All the other animals, as well as the plants, were no more than machines. It was Descartes' view that gave rise to the conception of soul as a ghost in the machine. The attempt to reduce nature to sheer mechanism is a type of anthropomorphism that has become less attractive to modern physics, but which one still encounters among biologists who believe that in mathematical physics and chemistry the world is entirely accessible to the human mind The way Descartes had placed man in two utterly distinct compartments, one of machinery, the other of a self-intuiting soul, soon • made of philosophy an analysis of mind and of the elements of consciousness ; the mind now had a direct hold upon itself which had never, not even in Platonism, been claimed' before. On the other . ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIME?ïTS 103 hand, the mathematisation of nature, which reached a successful, though temporary, climax with Isaac Newton, produced a world image far more simple than even that of Democritus. Now the whole point is that this world-machine fiction had aroused, prior to Newton, new hope in the unwieldy realm of moral philosophy. Alter all, Hobbes, who identified reasoning with arithmetic computation, intended his moral philosophy to be " more arithmetico demonstrata ; " later, Spinoza's Ethica was meant to be " or-dine geometrico demonstrata." Theirs was in fact the age of moral ` systems.' The intellectuals became convinced of an irrefutable certainty that man could become the absolute maker of his own perfection and that the one sure method of achieving this was that of sheer science, the science that stands for construction and for practical achievement ; a science where pian is principle, either in the order of thought alone as in logic and mathematics Where the constructive role of reason is preponderant, or in such experimental sciences as will give us increasing power over nature. We find this attitude anticipated in the following passage from Descartes' Discours de la Méthode : car elles m'ont fait voir qu'il est possible de parvenir à des connaissances qui soient fort utiles à la vie ; et qu'au lieu de cette Philosophie spéculative qu'on enseigne dans les écoles on en peut trouver une pratique par laquelle connaissant la force et les actions du feu, de l'eau, de l'air, des astres, des cieux, et de tous les autres corps qui nous environnent, aussi distinctement que nous connaissons les divers métiers de nos artisans, nous les pourrions employer en même façon à tous les usages auxquels ils sont propres, et ainsi nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de la Nature.' The xvinth Century was indeed an age that rejected fancy and desired to be guided by reason. It wished to understand, not to imagine. If there was one emotion which seemed to it suspect, out of place, bordering on madness, it was enthusiasm Whether that of faith or that of IVIetaphysics.2 The self-satisfaction which characterized the achievements of this century may be seen in the words of G. B. Buhl in his history of Philosophy written in 1797 : We are now approaching the most recent period of the history of philosophy Which is the most remarkable and brilliant period of philosophy as well as of the sciences, and of the arts and of the civilization of humanity in general. The seed which had been planted in the immediately preceding centuries began to bloom in the eighteenth. Of no century can it be said with so much truth as of the eighteenth that it utilized the achievements 1. René DESCARTES, Discours de la Méthode, Paris, Librairie A. Ratier, .sixième partie, P.î6. 2. Émile LEGUOrs and Louis CAZAMIAN, A History of English Literature, translated horn the French by Helen Irvine and W. D. MacInnes, New York, The MacMillan Co., 1935, p.197. 104 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE . ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 105 of its predecessors to bring humanity to a greater physical, intellectual and moral perfection. It has reached a height which, considering the limitations of human nature and the course of our past experiences, we should be surprised to see the genius of future generations maintain.' It was indeed an Age that rejected fancy and all claims of the emotions and desired to be guided by reason alone. As a result of Newton's celestial mechanics, and a universal application of it which he himself never intended, man fell into place amidst this newly ordered world and, as Randall observes, he and his institutions were included in the order of nature and the scope of the recognized scientific method, and in all things the newly invented social sciences were assimilated to the physical sciences." Newton was acclaimed-as-the greatest mind of all ages and Pope wrote of him : " Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night : God said, let Newton be ! and all was light." 8 Since Nature was considered to be thoroughly orderly and humanly rational it followed that whatever was natural was rational and Nature and the Natural were interpreted as Reason and the Reasonable and became the ideal of man and of human society. This rationalistic outlook, then, did not confine itself to any particular sphere of activity but invaded all fields. The opening years of the xviiith Century were astir with religious controversies. As reason grew bolder and gained ground it attempted to shed natural light upon the obscure parts of religion. The alleged conflict between revealed dogma and scientific discoveries as well as the rivalries of sects and their mutual persecution, led the people to lose respect for the traditional churches and follow the rationalistic tendency of their age, seeking a belief that would conform to their vague ideas of Reason and Nature. Therefore we find an attempt to find a natural religion which would admit a God but not a creed, a reasonable religion which would do away with all mysteries and be based upon understanding rather than on revelation. Both morality and religion were examined in the light of reason and made to conform to it. The philosophy of empiricism as taught by Locke had added its influence to rationalism and severed the connection between the mind and objects of reality. A subjectivism resulted which made the human mind the measure of 1. Friedrich PAULSEN, A System of Ethics, 4th ed., New York, Charles Scribner & Company, 1899, p.147. Quotation from G. B. Buhl. 2. John Hermann RANDALL, The Making of the Modern Mind, New York, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 1926, p.255. 3. Ernest C. MossNmx, Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason, New York, The MacMillan Co., 1936, p.XI. reality itself in the fields of practical philosophy such as ethics, politics and economics. Since he is not born with knowledge of the distinction between good and evil, •" man forms by reason out of experience moral values which, at least theoretically, are capable of demonstration as incontestable as mathematics itself. Experience shows that things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain and man's sole guide to choice of action is his reason." 1 Thus the individual was conceived as law unto himself — which in a sense is true of the virtuous man. Locke's .statement that the reason " must be our last judge and guide in everything " " was the motto of the Deists. He gave to Deism its philosophical basis by limiting human knowledge to the empirical and thereby denying the possibility of establishing fundamental principles of morality. This religion of reason held firmly to the belief that .Nature contained a law which was to be discovered and followed exactly like all the other laws pointed out by Newton. It was taken for granted that the natural law of human behaviour were identical in kind with those of physics. It became the vogue to glorify the savages and Indians as the pure types of human nature who were uncorrupted by tradition and following a universal, primitive and socially useful order . of morals. The philosophy built around Newtonian science was destroying the Christian concept of God with its wealth and depth of feeling, to formulate a philosophical religion which appealed only to the cool and deliberate reason of the truly rational man. The great Saints and mystics were bitterly criticized for being primarily concerned with mysteries which they could never hope to explain or understand, instead of contemplating man who answered to set rules and had a definite standard of life and morals entirely within his reach. To a great extent Christianity was looked upon as the enemy of moral virtue because it influenced " the mind by fear of God, not by love of good." 3 - The mind of the xviiith Cent-dry. was so attracted by the idea of general laws and universal fixity that it no longer considered it pos- sible to draw a distinction between the spiritual and the natural. The revolt from theology had blinded men to the deeper meanings veiled in theological teachings and led to a contemptuous estimate of the great moving forces which had Uttered themselves in theological language as mere fanaticism, enthusiasm and superstition.4 1. Ernest C. `IossNSn, op. cit., p.43. 2. LocKE, Essay on Human Understanding, Bk.IV. ch.XDC, a.14. 3• John Henry Cardinal NEwatA.N, The Idea of a University, 8th ed., London, Long-mans, Green & Company, 1888, p.197. 4. Sir Leslie" STEPHENS, s.c.B., History of English Thought in the %YIiith Century, radon, John Murray, Albemarle St., 1927, Vol.11, p.98. 106 LAVAL THiOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 107 As science ascertained more and more clearly the inadequacy of ancient notions concerning the Universe, the place of the earth itself and, accordingly, the spacial position of man in the Universe, there was increasing doubt about the religious doctrines that had been held. It became daily more difficult to identify the god of philosophy with the God of Christianity. How could the tutelary deity of a petty tribe be the God of the Medieval imagination, the God worshipped by the Christians when Christendom was regarded as approximately identical with the Universe be still the ruler of the whole earth, in which Christians formed but a small minority and of the universe in which the earth was but as a grain of sand on the seashore ? L After substituting the abstract metaphysical deity identified with Nature, for the personal Ruler and God of the Christians man found himself faced with the problem of explaining any restrictiôns or evils in nature. If God is Nature, He must sanction all instincts and all forces alike. This rationalism was in some measure gradually tempered by a wave of sentimentalism. We recognize traces of a reaction which showed an instinctive and obstinate preference for the rights of morals and sentiment. Lord Shaftsbury was prominent in his support of this active opposition against the rationalistic interpretation of nature which used the mathematically balanced line as its ideal, employed diagrams instead of images and a system of axioms instead of rich mythology. He returned to the ancient classical notions of harmony and aesthetic beauty in the universe as found in the Neo-Platonic schools which stress the importance of the relation between the beautiful and the good. Rejecting the ideas which opposed the state of nature to the social state he insisted upon man's ability to live outside society. He continually refers to " a uniform consistent fabric " and to " a universal mind " by which the whole is animated. He used the term " moral sense " to indicate " that natural tendency to virtue which is implicitly denied in the dogma of human corruption." Moreover, he attributed to it the power to admire the noble and the good, and to penetrate into the evil and to arrive at a proper harmonious balance in distinguishing the character of an action. Virtue for Shaftesbury was its own recompense and just as the music lover gets full satisfaction from indulging his taste, so the virtuous man contemplates virtue in all its aesthetic beauty without dreaming of further reward than that deep enjoyment felt by him at the sight of such perfect proportion and harmony. Shaftesbury attributes divinity to human nature itself and thus tries to avoid the difficulty of having his "moral sense " influenced by our selfish instincts. 1. STEPHENS, op. cit., Vo1.I, p.81. 2. STEPHENS, op. cit., VO1.II, p.29. Those moralists. who followed Shaftesbury may be considered as successfully modifying or developing his theory. There is, it is maintained by them all, a certain mysterious harmony or order in the Universe which reveals itself to the divine faculty or conscience. With Shaftesbury the faculty is almost identified with the aesthetic perceptions and is rather a sentiment than a power of intellectual intuition. By his followers the doctrine takes a moral formal shape. The sense of harmony is made more definite as a perception of final causes.' This change of attitude was further developed by Francis Hutcheson, the immediate predecessor of Adam Smith and to whom the latter was deeply indebted. Hutcheson too likens the moral sense to an internal sense that perceives moral excellence or turpitude as external senses perceive colours, sounds, and so forth. In him we find strongly marked the Newtonian concept -of God as a skillful contriver of an harmonious system which works with machine-like precision. The moral sense, in concord with this, points by a prearranged harmony to the course productive of the. greatest happiness ; actually it is "nothing but the approval of such affections and consequently of such courses of action, as are most conducive to the public welfare." In a final analysis it appears that utility is for him the sole and sufficient guide to and measure of virtue. It seems too " that the standard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of others ; " and that " we could have a knowledge of good and evil without and prior to a knowledge of God,4 which is no doubt true. But when he does turn to God, we see that Hutcheson belonged to an era we are back to the deity of the xviith century, who lived only for human welfare and whose will was not to be known from mysterious signs and providence, but from a broad consideration of the greater good of mankind— the greatest happiness of the greatest number Adam Smith, who was born in Kirkcaldy, 1723, in an age of religious doubts and philosophic curiosity, reacted to this environment by formulating an ethical system of his own. He shared the general enthusiasm in regard to Newton and held the latter's discovery to be the greatest ever made-by man. He looked upon him as the only natural philosopher whose system, instead of being a mere invention of the imagination to connect otherwise discordant phenomena, 1. STEPHENS, op. cit., Vo1.II, p.78. 2. " In the scope of his philosophy, in temper and practical aim, Smith may be called e spiritual descendent of Hutcheson." Francis W. HrxsT, 4dam Smith, English Men of Letters, London, Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1904, 3. STEPHENS, op. cit., Vol.II, p.61. 4. John RAE, Life of Adam Smith, London, Macmillan & Company, 1895, p.13. 5. Ibid., p.12. 108 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTDJENTS 109 appeared to contain in itself " the real chains which Nature makes use of to bind together her several operations." Although he was deeply imbued with the rationalistic tendencies of his age, he yielded nevertheless to the influences of the sentimental school, and endeavored to work out a system which. would explain man and society in terms of both reason and instinct. He did not concede to the rationalists in their teaching that man's reason alone is sufficient to guide and control his destiny but insisted upon certain impulses implanted in every man by Nature, which are 'wiser than human reason and which cooperate with nature's designs for man and society. As already mentioned, the two great works in-which Adam Smith presents his philosophical doctrines are The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. The former, written during his early years while a professor of floral philosophy in the ti riiversitÿ of Glasgow, deals with the development of the psychological theory of the origin of the moral judgment. In discussing the moral faculty-by which we distinguish between righ and wrong, he also reveals his theological convictions. A thorough representative of an optimistic Deism he despises anything that savours of religious zeal or enthusiasm. His second work was written many years later. During the inter. val he had travelled extensively and spent much of his time in France where he became acquainted with the teachings of the French Physio- crats. It is evident from his work that he shared their faith in a strictly rational order in society even while allowing all men to follow their innate instincts and to work for their own selfish interests. In his critical review of the older "systems " Smith says that there are two questions to be considered : First, wherein does virtue consist ? Or what is the tone of temper, and tenor of conduct, which constitutes the • excellent and praiseworthy character, the character which is the natural object of esteem, honour, and approbation? And secondly, by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us ? Or, in other words, how and by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenor of conduct to another. denominates the one right and the other wrong ; considers the one as the object of approbation, honor, and reward, and the other of blame,• censure, and punishment ? 2 His answer to the first question is that the character of virtue must be ascribed indifferently to all our affections when under proper government and direction, or to some one class or division of our affections. Here there are two general classes of affections ; the 1. John RAE, Life of Adam Smith. 2. Adam Slum, Essays, London, Alex Murray & Son, 1869, p.236. selfish, regulated by what Smith calls " prudence ", and the altruistic, regulated by benevolence. According to Smith, Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, in different ways found the character of virtue in propriety. Propriety is said of all our affections when they are under proper government and direction. After a somewhat sketchy and faltering account of this doctrine, he conveys his evaluation in very significant terms. The ancient Greeks tried to show that happiness was either entirely (Stoics) or to a great extent (Platonists and Peripatetics) independent of fortune and based more on the enjoyment of " the complete approbation of (the virtuous man's) own breast." He commends their " spirit and manhood " and contrasts it to " the desponding, plaintive and whining tone of some modern systems But this propriety, Smith holds, is but one part of virtue. He then goes On 'With a criticism of certain contemporary systems which also confine the character of virtue to propriety. However. he says, « None of those systems either give, or even pretend to give. any precise or distinct measure by which this fitness or propriety can be ascertained or judged of. That precise and distinct measure can be found nowhere but in the sympathetic feelings or the 'impartial and well-informed spectator. » 1 Smith's reactions to these systems is well expressed in his own words : The description of virtue, besides, which is either given or at least meant and intended to be given in each of those systems, for sonic of the modern authors are not very fortunate in their manner of expressing themselves. is no doubt quite just, so far as it goes. There is no virtue without propriety, and wherever there is propriety some degree of approbation is due. But still this description is imperfect. For though propriety is an essential ingredient in every virtuous action, it is not always the sole ingredient. Beneficent actions have in them another quality by which they appear not only to deserve approbation but recompense. None of those systems account either easily or sufficiently for that superior degree of esteem which seems due to such actions, or for that diversity of sentiment which they naturally excite. Neither is the description of vice more complete. For, in the same manner, though impropriety is a necessary ingredient in every vicious action, it is not always the sole ingredient ; and there is often the highest degree of absurdity and impropriety in very harmless and insignificant actions. Deliberate actions, of a pernicious tendency to those we live with, have, besides their impropriety, a peculiar quality of their own by Which they appear to deserve, not only disapprobation, but punishment : and to be the objects, not of dislike merely, but of resentment and revenge and none of those systems easily and sufficiently account for that superior degree of detestation which we feel for such actions.2 1. Adam SMITH, Essaye, p.259. Italics ours. 2. Ibid., p.260. Italics ours. • 110 LAVAL THZOLOGIQUE. ET PHILOSOPHIQUE Then he begins to take up those systems which make virtue consist in what Smith calls " prudence." The first of these is Epicureanism, which made bodily pain and pleasure the criteria of virtue. Smith rejects this materialism of Epicurus and insists that there are spiritual values which are overlooked in this system. However, careful exam ination of Smith's own theory and his criticism of Epicurus and others might make us wonder if Smith's notion of the spiritual does not require the same careful examination as his notion of " prudence." He then concerns himself with a system which he claims was espoused by the Eclectics and later Platonists, whereby virtue consists in imitating the benevolence and love which influenced all the actions of the deity. Smith says that according to Dr. Hutcheson virtue consists in pure and disinterested altruism. Hutcheson himself uses Such expressions-as " the greatest possible good," " the general happi-. ness of mankind." Failing to distinguish between virtuous love of self and egoism, Hutcheson said that " self-love was a principle that could never be virtuous in any degree or in any direction." 1 On this score Smith wisely observes that " in the common judgments of mankind, however, this regard of the approbation of our own minds (wich Hutcheson rejects) is so far from being considered as what can in any respect diminish the virtue of any action, that it is often rather looked upon as the sole motive which deserves the appellation of virtuous." 2 He adds that such a system does not seem to explain the " approbation of the inferior virtues of prudence, vigilance, circumspection, temperance, constancy and firmness." For Smith these three systems which place virtue in propriety, prudence and benevolence respectively are fundamental positions on this question and all other systems are reducible to these. All the same, it is very difficult to see how Smith's moral sentiments are related to these three systems. He himself does not tell us. After a discussion of what he terms " licentious systems ", where he criticizes Dr. Mandeville for attempting to " impose on our credulity " with a system so preposterous that no man in his right mind could accept it, Smith begins to determine the position of the other moralists as regards the second question, namely, by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us. Here again we have three opinions : [1] We approve or disapprove of our own actions and those of others from selflove only, from some view of their tendency to our own happiness or disadvantage. • [2] Reason enables us to distinguish .between the fitting and unfitting in both actions and affections. [3] The distinction between fitting and unfitting is the effect of immediate sentiment and feeling 1. Ibid., p.268. 2. Ibid., pp.268-269. 3. Ibid., p.269. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 111 and arises from the satisfaction or disgust with which the view of certain actions or affections inspires us. Iii regard to the first, he says that some, like Hobbes, hold that society is necessary and that virtue is necessary to maintain society. While agreeing in part with the position, he says that " This account of the origin of approbation and disapprobation, runs into that principle which gives beauty to utility . . ." 1 In this same passage he refers to human society not only as " the production of human art," as Aristotle had said, but as a. " beautiful and noble machine." His disagreement arises from the fact that Hobbes' explanation of virtue fails to show how we approve of the actions of the ancients whose society was not ours. He insists that " when these authors deduce from self-love the 'interest which we take in the welfare of society, and the esteem which upon that account we bestow upon virtue, they do not mean, that when we in this age applaud the virtue of Cato, and detest the villainy of Cataline, our sentiments are influenced by the notion of any benefit we receive from the one, or of any detriment we suffer from the other." 2 For him it was not self-love but rather its opposite, benevolence, which was responsible for our interest. He says, The idea, in short, which those authors were groping about, but which they were never able to unfold distinctly, was that indirect sympathy which we feel with the gratitude or resentment of those who received the benefit or suffered the damage resulting from such opposite characters : and it was this which they were indistinctly pointing at, when they said, that it was not the thought of what we gained or suffered which prompted our applause or indignation, but the conception or imagination of what we might. gain or suffer if we were to act in society with such associates.' He says further that this whole notion of self-love arises from " some confused misapprehension of the system of sympathy." For Smith, sympathy appears in no way based upon self-love. In regard to the second system, namely, that the principle of :approbation is reason, he says that in opposition to Hobbes, whose doctrine made right and wrong depend on the arbitrary will of the ruler, some thought to place the foundation of all law in the mind. These writers, he says, felt it necessary to prove " that antecedent to all law or positive institution, the mind was naturally endowed with a faculty, by which it distinguished in certain actions and affections, the qualities of right, laudable, and virtuous, and in others those of wrong, blamable, and vicious." He refers to a Dr. Cudworth as Proving that law could not be the original source of these distinctions 1. Ibid., p.280. 2. Ibid., p.280. 3. Ibid., p.281. 1 112 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE " since upon the supposition of such a law, it must either be right to obey it, and wrong to disobey it, or indifferent whether we obeyed or disobeyed it. That law which it was indifferent whether we obeyed or disobeyed, could not, it was evident, be the source of those distinctions; neither could that which it was right to obey and wrong to disobey, since even this still supposed the antecedent notions or ideas of right and wrong, and that obedience to the law was conformable to the idea of right and disobedience to that of wrong." 1 He admits that the fact "that virtue consists in conformity to reason, is true in some respect, ... by reason we discover those general rules of justice ... we form those more vague and indeterminate ideas of what is prudent, of which is decent, ... The general maxims of morality are formed like all other general maxims, from experience and induction. From reason, therefore, we are properly said to derive all those general maxims and ideas." For him, while reason is the source of general rules, the particular cases from which these general rules are formed are the objets, not of reason, but of sense and feeling. He says that " pleasure and pain are the great objects of desire and aversion : but these are distinguished, not by reason, but by immediate sense and feeling. If virtue, therefore, be desirable for its own sake, and if vice be, in the same manner, the object of aversion, it cannot be reason which originally distinguishes these different qualities, but immediate sense and feeling." 3 Then he goes on to the position that the principle of approbation is found in sentiment. Here we have two opinions : [1] Sentiment is of a peculiar nature, distinct from any other, called a " moral sense " ; [2] Sympathy is sufficient to account for all the effects ascribed to the above faculty. He says that among those who attribute the principle of approbation to a moral sense there is Dr. Hutcheson who called this new power of perception a moral sense. He objects to this for the reason that the qualities belonging to the object of the sense cannot be ascribed to the sense. But a man can be driven so as to approve of vice, and would thus have a bad moral sense. Others said that the moral sense was a peculiar sentiment which answers a given purpose and no other. He has several objections to this. In the first place, just as there is a common perception of anger in all its varieties, so there should be a common perception of approbation, but this is not so since we have entirely different feelings, for instance, of a " tender, delicate and humane sentiment" and one " that appears great, daring and magnanimous." = We are softened by the one and elevated by the other. And again he asks : 1. Ibid., p.282. 2. Ibid., p.233 (only selected significant passages). 3. Ibid., p.2S4. 4. Ibid., p.288. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 113 how is it " that, according to this system, we approve or disapprove of proper or improper approbation " ? Smith says that " when the approbation with which our neighbour regards the conduct of a. third person coincides with our own, we approve of his approbation, and consider it as, in some measure, morally good." After this he offers an Objection which is for him very important. Why has this moral sense never been given a name ? The term, he says, is relatively recent. Even " approbation " was too young to be entitled to much consideration. He considers the term " conscience but decides that it does not immediately denote a moral faculty but rather " supposes, . indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions." 2 Finally he considers the attempts of some to account for the origins of moral sentiments from sympathy, distinct from that which I have been endeavouring to establish. It is that which places virtue in utility, and accounts for the pleasure with which the spectator surveys the utility of any quality from sympathy with the happiness of those who are affected by it. This sympathy is different both from that by which we enter into the motives of the agent, and from that by which we go along with the gratitude of the persons who are benefited by his actions. It is the same principle with that by which we approve of a well contrived machine. But no machine can be the object of either of those two last mentioned sympathies.3 Earlier in this book he had made the distinction when he spoke of beauty and utility.' 'When we consider virtue and vice in an abstract and general manner they present an appearance of utility which in turn gives rise to the perception of a " species of beauty." Still he is not prepared to agree with those who would identify this perception of beauty, which admittedly is pleasant, with our sentiment of the approbation of virtue. To do this would make the approbation of virtue a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building. Another consideration is that the sentiment of approbation of virtue always involves in it a sense of propriety which is quite distinct from the perception of utility.' 1. Ibid., p.289. 2. Ibid., p.289. 3. Ibid., p.290. 4. Ibid., p.165ff. 5. Ibid., pp.167-168. " The qualities most useful to aurselves are, first of all, superior reason and understanding, by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions and of fore-seeing the advantage or detriment which is hkelY to result from them : and secondly, self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure, (8) L 114 LAVAL THiOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTLMENTS 115 Virtue is defined by Smith as " excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary." 1 He refuses to allow anything below excellence to be termed virtue : "As in the common degree of the intellectual qualities there is no ability, so in the common degree of the moral, there is no virtue." 2 or to avoid a greater pain in some future time. In the union of those two qualities consists the virtue of prudence, of all the virtues that which is the most useful to the individual. " With regard to the first of those qualities, it has been observed on a former occasion, that superior reason and understanding are originally approved of as just and right and accurate, and not merely useful or advantageous. It is in abstruser sciences, particularly in the higher parts of mathematics, that the greatest and most admired exertions of human reason have been displayed. But the utility of those sciences, either to the individual or to the public, is not very obvious, and to prove it, requires a discussion which is not always very easily comprehended. It was not, therefore, their utility which first recommended them to the -public admiration. This _quality was but „little insisted .upon, till it became necessary to make some reply tô the reproaches of those, who, having themselves no taste for such sublime discoveries, endeavoured to depreciate them as useless. " That self-command, in the same manner, by which we restrain our present appetites, in order to gratify them inure fully upon another occasion, is approved of, as much under the aspect of propriety, as under that of utility. When we act in this manner the senti- ments which influence our conduct seem exactly to coincide with those of the spectator. The spectator, however, does not feel the solicitations of our present appetites. " To him the pleasure which we are to enjoy a week hence, or a year hence is just as interesting as that which we are to enjoy this moment. When for the sake of the present, therefore, we sacrifice the future, our conduct appears to him absurd and extravagant in the highest degree, and he cannot enter into the principles which influence it. On the contrary, when we abstain from present pleasure, in order to secure greater pleasure to come, when we act as if the remote object interested us as much as that which immediately correspond with his own, he cannot fail to approve of our behaviour : and as he knows from experience, how few are capable of this self-command, he looks upon our conduct with a considerable degree of wonder and admiration. Hence arises that eminent esteem with which all men naturally regard a steady perseverance in the practice of frugality, industry, and application, though directed to. no other purpose than the acquisition of fortune. The resolute firmness of the person who acts in this manner, and in order to obtain a great though remote advantage, not only gives us all present pleasures, but endures the greatest labour both of mind and body, necessarily commands our approbation. That view of his interest and happiness which appears to regulate his conduct exactly tallies with the idea which we naturally form of it. There is the most perfect correspondence between his sentiments and our own and at the same time, from our experience of the common weakness of human nature, it is a correspondence which we could not reasonably have expected. We not only approve, therefore, but in some measure admire his conduct and think it worthy of a considerable degree of applause. It is the consciousness of this merited approbation and esteem which is alone capable of supporting the agent in this tenor of conduct. The pleasure which we are to enjoy ten years hence interests us so little in comparison with that which we may enjoy today, the passion which the first excites is naturally so weal in comparison with that violent emotion which the second is apt to give occasion to, that the one could never be any balance to the other, unless it was supported by the sense of propriety, by the consciousness that we merited the esteem and approbation of everybody, by acting in the one way, and that we became the proper .objects of their contempt and derision by behaving in the other." 1. Ibid., p.24. 2. Ibid., p.24. For him the virtues are divided into two types, the first of which he refers to as the soft, gentle and amiable virtues, and the second as great, awful and respectable. The first set is founded upon the spectators efforts to enter into the feelings of another person, while the second arises from the person's efforts to restrict his emotions to the level of the spectator. All virtue for Smith must have its roots in sympathy. He establishes this sympathy or participation in the feelings of others as the basis of morality. However, he qualified sympathy by saying that in order to have ethical value it must be the sympathy experienced by an impartial and well-informed spectator. The only faculty that can be used to awaken and sustain these sympathetic sentiments is the imagination, since it alone enables us to go out of ourselves and for the time being, at least, to place ourselves in another's predicament„so as to,..experience his .joys and sorrows. Experience proves that this and this alone is the source of our fellow feelings for the misery of others.” 1 This sympathy must pass beyond the limits of individuality and we must by exercising our imagination attempt to place ourselves in the exact position -of the person to be judged, and feel as much as we possibly can the same sentiments and emotions that he is experiencing. This is looked upon by Smith as a very natural process and he gives examples of the way in which we instinctively shrink when we witness a scene in _which someone is receiving an injury of some description, and adds that we seem to actually feel the pain of the victim in our own bodies. He also mentions the common experience of having one's eyes water in a sympathetic reaction to seeing another person's eyes water. It is only after imaginatively placing ourselves in this situation that we are able to express our approval or disapproval of another man's judgment or action. If we feel that we can enter into his feeling with sympathy and not find it revolting in any way, we are then moved to give our approval, but if we are not in agreement with his emotions but feel that he is allowing himself to be too much influenced by some situation, then we disapprove. " Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another." z In trying to discover what approval or disapproval we can give to our own actions, we Must have recourse once again to the idea of two persons, as it were ; one representing the judge and the other the impartial spectator. It becomes necessary to divide oneself into the one to be examined. In this way we can, in a certain sense, place ourselves at a distance from ourselves to allow a more unprejudiced review of our deeds or misdeeds and see if we can feel justified in 11G LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE - sympathizing with them when we look at them from the viewpoint of an outsider. Since his moral system demands a constant changing of places and balancing of judgments in so far as we must continually place ourselves in other people's situations to judge their conduct as well as our. own, Smith is quite emphatic about the necessity of man living in society if his actions are to be provided with a norm or standard by which they can be classified as proper or. improper. Society is the mirror in which we see ourselves as other human beings see us and therefore it enables us to regulate our conduct in conformity with the general judgment. If a man could grow up to maturity in complete isolation in some solitary place, with no means of communication whatsoever with the members of his own species, he would be absolutely incapable of thinking of merit or demerit in reference to..his. own character he could no more think of the beauty or deformity of his mind or conduct than he could judge of the beauty or deformity of. his own face. Man needs his fellow creatures as reflectors and models by which lie can measure his own perfection or imperfection. In this way we can always have a means of testing to see if our actions are such that other people can sympathize with then and use them as a standard for themselves. Our interest in beauty and morals consists wholly and solely in the effect that will be produced upon those around us ; " Virtue is not said to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love or of its own gratitude, but because it excites those sentiments in other men." 1 As well as the propriety or impropriety of actions we must also consider the qualities of merit and demerit which make us deserving or either reward or punishment. The sentiment which seems to prompt us most immediately to do good to another is gratitude, and the one which leads us to punish is resentment. The impartial spectator can enter with sympathy into .either situation. " As our sense, therefore, of the propriety of conduct arises from what I shall call a direct sympathy with the affections and motives of the person who acts, so our sense of its merit arises from what I. shall call an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon." 2 In the case of resentment, nature itself has endowed men with " an immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred and necessary law of retaliation " ; 3 thereby not leaving it to man's reason to determine the proper means of revenging great crimes. To be the complete and proper object of either the sentiment of gratitude or of that of resentment, three different qualifications are 1. Ibid., p.102 (italics ours). 2. Ibid., p.68. • 3. Ibid., p.65. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 117 needed in a person : (1) he must be the cause of pleasure or pain : (2) he must be capable of feeling those sensations himself ; and (3) he must not only have produced these sensations but must have clone so from design. Regardless, however, of the intention of the agent a certain amount of approval or of disapproval falls on his actions themselves. " That the world judges by the event, and not by the design, has been in all ages the complaint, and is the great discouragement of virtue." 1 If the consequences of an action are favorable, whether due to fortune or to the actual intention or plan of the agent, praise is given which is often far beyond what the person really deserves ; whereas if the action fails to produce the proposed and successful effect and appears had and a failure in the eyes and judgment of the onlookers, regardless of the loftiness or of the praiseworthiness of the agent's interior purpose, he becomes the object of blame and demerit. Even this unjust arrangement, however, seems to ' hav=e been planned by Nature for the happiness and perfection of the human species. If it were otherwise, we would be continually attributing blamable and even evil intentions to many persons regardless of the outcome of their actions. Our resentment would be easily aroused and " we should feel all the furies of that passion against any person in whose breast we suspected or believed such designs or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any actions." For this reason Adam Smith teaches that only actions which produce actual evil or attempt to produce it are the proper objects of punishment. Sentiments and intentions are only known to the " great Judge of hearts " and are reserved for the " cognizance of his own unerring tribunal." 3 We can only base our approval or disapproval on what is evident to our senses and it then happens that " To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those Opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them." 4 According to Smith, it is perfectly natural for man to desire to be approved of and to wish to make himself worthy of this approval, therefore a real love of virtue and a hatred of vice is natural. We 'do not act in an honourable fashion because of our great love of our neighbour or of mankind in general, but rather because of a stronger love which is that of the grandeur and dignity and superiority of our own characters. However, we must cover up this self-love since it would make us the object of the scorn and indignation of society and this is a situation that we must avoid at all costs. " As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the greatest law of Christianity, 1. Ibid., p.96. 2. Ibid., p.96. 3. Ibid., p.96. 4. Ibid., p.17. —A 118 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing as our neighbour is found capable of loving us." ' Inclined as we are to be prejudiced in our own behalf, our judgments concerning our own actions are likely to be out of focus and therefore, when it is a question relating to personal interest that has to be answered, we must step outside of ourselves and adopt a purely neutral and impartial position. Small affairs of great personal interest mean much more to us than the most important affairs of great nations. A disaster which would cost the lives of thousands of the inhabitants of a faraway country would cause less real disturbance to an ordinary man than the loss of his little finger or an unfortunate business deal. The only thing capable of overcoming this inordinate self-love is a respect and reverence for " reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct." 2 Upon all occasions when there is a conflict between the judgment given by the spectator within and those without it is necessary to have recourse to a higher tribunal, " to that of the all-seeing Judge of the world." 3 If we act otherwise we are eventually overcome by qualms of conscience and are victims to remorse from which frightful condition society is powerless to save us. Since there are times when the violence and injustice of our selfish passions throw off the true report of the impartial spectator, there are certain precautions to be observed. It is always necessary to observe ourselves under two different aspects or at two different times : first, when we are about to act ; and second, when we have completed the action. The first often proves extremely difficult because of the overwhelming strength of our passions, and even in the second case we are inclined to be prejudiced in our own favor and to try to throw a protecting cover over our misdeeds. No one enjoys thinking ill of himself and therefore pride prompts us to turn away from any unfavorable circumstances and to be most lenient in our judgment of our ouu conduct. It is far from hard to find plausible excuses for our deeds. To correct these misrepresentations of self-love, general rules have been formulated. " They are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of.'" A careful observation of the conduct of others teaches man what it is fitting for him to do and what he should avoid doing in order to be a suitable member of the society in which he lives. Mankind ex- 1. Ibid., p.24. 2. Ibid., p.120. 3. Ibid., p.116. 4. Ibid., p.139. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY of MORAL SENTIMENTS 119 periences an awesome respect and reverence for these rules that serve to check passions that are too violent and to temper unbridled impetuosity. This regard for the general rules is known as a sense of duty, " a principle of the greatest consequence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions." ' The very existence itself of human society depends upon the faithful observance of these rules, and the deep reverence for them is " further enhanced by an opinion which is first impressed by nature and afterwards confirmed by reasoning and philosophy, that those important rules of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will finally reward the obedient and punish the transgressors of their duty." 2 He reinforces this argument with the observation that in addition to these reasons it is really for the personal good and happiness of the individual to follow the designs and commands of duty since virtue is_ rewarded in this world as well as in the next. A strict observance and faithful carrying out of the injunctions of duty will in the majority of instances result in the attainment of wealth, confidence, esteem and love ; in his way of looking at things there is little more to be expected in this life since he feels that there is little to be added to the happiness of a man who is " out of debt and has a clear conscience.' 3 Nature is continually working through her own rules and laws for the perfection and happiness of mankind and it only remains for man to cooperate with her by following her inspirations and commands. Even in those cases or circumstances in which man is overcome by misfortunes, he is still able to maintain a free conscience in this life and he is rewarded with the hope of happiness and security in a future life. Although his attitude towards religion often leaves us in a puzzled frame of mind as to exactly what he does believe in personally, at least in this part of his work it seems fairly evident that he did believe that " religion enforces the natural sense of duty," ' and is therefore an aid to man and society. This does not mean, however, that the sense of duty is the sole principle by which we guide our conduct but " it should be the ruling and the governing one, as philosophy, and as indeed, common sense directs." 6 We must allow for the great influence which sentiment or affection has on our own conduct and on our relations with others. The general rules are in themselves too broad or loose to be the only criteria and for this reason they must be made more exact and precise by taking into consideration the various circumstances which affect 1. Ibid., p.142. 2. Ibid., p.144. 3. Ibid., p.43. 4. Ibid., p.150. 5. Ibid., p.151. 120 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 121 an action. " No action can properly be called virtuous, which is not accompanied with the sentiment of self-approbation," 1 but common experience shows that man often acts from a false sense of duty and when we are condemning such a one we cannot keep ourselves from sympathizing with him since we know that he has acted according to his principles and therefore in his own mind he can give himself his unstinted approval and even praise. We are inclined to admire a man who is faithful to his principles even though we cannot find it in our hearts to approve of those principles. Therefore, as well as regarding the dictates of the general rules of morality, we must also take into account the " natural agreeableness or deformity of the sentiment or affection which would prompt us to any action independent of all regard to general rules." 2 The only general rule which allows no looseness or free interpretation in its application to particular cases is that of jùstice, which is rigorous in its determinations. By what faculty then are we to give the final judgment concerning right and wrong ? Adam Smith says that in some sense we may if we wish consider reason as " the source and principle of approbation and disapprobation and of all solid judgments concerning right and wrong," 3 since it is reason that discovers the general rules of justice and regulates the greater part of our moral judgments to the extent that " the general maxims of morality are formed, like all other general maxims, from experience and induction ... and induction is always regarded as one of the operations of reason." Moreover, it gives a much more stable foundation for our moral judgments since such insignificant factors as different states of health and humour do not directly affect reason whereas they are capable of completely altering sentiment and feeling. However, though in some sense or in some respects reason may be given the credit for being the source of our moral judgments, Adam Smith will concede no more to it and refuses to allow that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from it. " These first perceptions as well as all other experiments upon which any general rules are founded, cannot be the object of reason, but of the immediate sense and feeling. It is by finding in a vast variety of instances that one tenor of conduct constantly pleases in a certain manner, and that another as constantly displeases the mind, that we form the general rules of morality. But reason cannot render any particular object either agreeable or disagreeable to the mind for its own sake." 6 All vice and virtue, pleasure 1. Ibid., p.I58. 2. Ibid., p.151. 3. Ibid., p.283. 4. Ibid., p.283. 5. Ibid., p.283. and pain are, therefore, not distinguished by reason but by immediate sense and feeling. Smith is convinced that Dr. Hutcheson had made this distinction sufficiently clear for any earnest reader to grasp, however he is not himself in complete agreement with this famous teacher for whom he feels the deepest respect. Instead of the moral sense " advocated by Dr. Hutcheson or the " conscience " as taught by Bishop Butler, Adam Smith substitutes the " man within the breast " or the " great judge and arbiter of conduct." Therefore, for him as Morrow explains, the " moral judgment is based, not upon inner intuition of rational truth nor upon a divine revelation, but upon the reflected sentiments of other individuals ; and the moral sentiments of himsell and of those of his fellowmen, mutually supporting and influencing one another, produce the objective order of moral standards. At the same time this objective moral order is not a transcendent rational order, like the order of immutable truth to which the intellectualist moralist appealed but an order immanent in human experience, and varying with the conditions of experience." 1 Mother _MARIE DE JLSt;s, R.S.H.M. (To be continued.) 1. Glenn R. Moarow, The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith, New York, Longmans Green & Company, 1923. Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 13, p.33.

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Adam Smith's Theory of.. Moral .:Sentiments * If Adam Smith had restricted himself to a description' .of the general sentiments or feelings which lead men to praise or blame others, he would perhaps have written a good work, but far less original. However, he was striving for more than that, in a direction that was indeed original for his time. In spite of his protestation that he is concerned with. "fact" and not " tight," 1 in spite of his statement that " We are not at present examining upon what principles a perfect being would approve of the .punishment of bad actions .; but upon what principles so weak and imperfect a creature as man actually. and in fact approves of it," ,2 and in spite of his many references to the vulgar applause of the mob, he is speaking of human actions and their principles, subjects upon which he is unfortunately vague. . He is, aware of a difference between the actual state of a man's character and the judgment of society about the man.3 This leads him to seek some common denominator which will unite these two. Briefly, he does this by his theory.f .: moral sentiments. Moral sentiments,, for him, are founded upon" instincts implanted.. in man by an all-wise Nature. While these-may be corrupted, and frequently are, still if we know the causes of ,corruption and have recourse to the judgment of society we shall be able to determine virtue for man in his present weak and imperfect state. • Contrary: to • many modern .writers on moral philosophy, Smith happily does not attempt to exhaust the subject in a purely speculative manner but actually proceeds in the practical mode.. ' Thus we feud many-passages-whichviewed-by-them-selveswee-must-agree with. However, when we examine these in the light of , the principles which he uses, we cannot follow him unreservedly. He extols friendship,4 he exalts the common good,6 he stresses . the necessity of virtue ; but in all this, while remaining in the practical order, he fails to see the proper- role of prudence in human actions. For this reason, whenever he attempts to investigate these ideas, he is led to conclusions which • are quite unacceptable. In a discussion of the common good, for example,6 with respect to the reason•for the punish . *:Fdr tfië fir`st pã~t ôf tluâ etüdÿ: geé L-avai—tlréulagitlue-et--philasevhigue, vol.—XVII; 1961, n.1, pp.100-121. 1. Adam Slam, Essays, p.71, footnote. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., pp.57-59. 4. Ibid., p.200. 5. Ibid., p.20¢. 6. Ibid.,. p.82. • 244 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE ment of crime he appears to condone personal vindictiveness — which is of course quite spontaneous. That it is not a regard to the preservation of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by many obvious considerations. The concern which we take in the fortune and happiness of individuals does not, in common oases,–ar-isefrom that which we take in the-fortune-and-happiness. of society. We are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a single man, because this man is a member or part of society, and because we should be concerned for the destruction of society, than we are concerned for the loss of a single guinea, because this guinea is a part of a thousand guineas, and because we should be concerned for the loss of the whole sum. 5. In neither case does our regard for the individual arise from our regard for the multitude : but in both cases our regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed.' In this confusion of the rule of practical action with judgments= based upon the cause and effect of the action 2 he apparently gives moral action a firm foundation in the individual. Actually, however, to so overlook the proximate rule of action leads to the alienation of the individual. This can be seen in his discussion of sympathy where he says that I judge the passion expressed by another to be good or bad in so far as it agrees with that which I would imagine myself to feel under the same circumstances ; on the other hand, the goodness of the other's actions depends upon my judgment, which must in turn be validated by society. If my judgment in this case is the, same as that of the greater part of the community I may feel certain that it is good. The implicit alienation of the self in this judgment as subject to others is made explicit when he describes how it is that I judge my own actions. In order to know whether our own action is good or bad " we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us." s In the same passage he adds : " Whatever jùdgment we can form concerning (our own sentiments and motives), accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to what are, or to what, upon. a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others." He follows this with a very remarkable metaphor to show man's dependence on society for his judgments of moral actions.4 Thus we have the 1. Ibid., p.82. 2. Ibid., p.19. 3. Ibid., p.99. 4. Ibid., p.100. " Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some .solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and er ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 245 other judged by the self, the self judged by becoming other, and both judgments validated by the community. Here . it must be noted that Smith attempts to base this validation by the community on something more than mere numerical superiority. Still, he feels compelled to admit that there are no perfect men and that we must also rely on the fact that a wise nature would not allow the corruption of these sentiments in the totality of mankind. In practice. this means that the common sentiments of the community must be adequate. Here again we see the paradoxical nature of this ' theory.' The " impartial spectator " is not human. He is always. " other." The proximate norm of human action thus appears far too detached. This alone would make us fail to see the distinction of prudènce from the moral virtues 1 and even lead one to assimilate prudence all too nearly with art. Smith was not aware that it belongs to prudence to determine the mean in all the moral virtues ; that, in this respect, it is the principle of all virtue which is strictly so called. In . one of his first references to it he speaks of prudence as modifying our show of emotion in victory lest we ' cause envy in others.2 It is a virtue which properly looks to the well-being of the individual.a Thus we do not take too great a pleasure in seeing a prudent man, but view him with a certain " cold esteem." 4 In the latter place, however, he speaks of a " superior prudence " when we combine it " with many greater and more splendid virtues, with valour, with extensive and strong benevolence, with a sacred regard for the rules of justice, and all these supported by a proper degree of self-command." 5 Here and in other places s he seems to give to " self-command " the directive power of prudence properly so called. In various references to what are, for him, the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice and benevolence 7 he always gives the lowest place to prudence. In other words, on the whole he uses the term prudence in a very narrow and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the bëãiity and deformit r f-hirowirmind.' 1. Ibid., p.229. 2. Ibid., p.45. 3. Ibid., p.188. 4. Ibid., p.191. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., pp.214, 215, 234, 235. 7. Ibid., pp.210, 233, 234 and esp.269. I 246. .LAVAL THI;OL•OŒ QUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE improper sense.' Actually, " prudence " can also mean the universally directive virtue of the whole of human life, as in Aristotle's Ethics. A .man who is prudent. only with respect to some particular end, such as making money, is actually imprudent if we bear in, mind the meaning_ just mentioned. The best that could be said of Smith's conception of prudence is that he apparently restricts it to the level _if±he purely personal virtue, the may temperance is primarily concerned with the personal good. Again, when he speaks of that " superior prudence," we. could understand this to mean that perfect prudence which is attended by all the moral virtues, namely, the right reason of whatever is to be done. He seems to have this in mind when he in fact describes the virtuous man .2 Smith himself, however, in his criticism of Epicurus,$ rejects prudence as the source of virtue. This falls in line with his disinclination to give any kind of normative office to the reason in .practical affairs. The reason of man is too weak to comprehend the ends which Providence has set for him 4 — as if this were a sine qua non. Although Smith .says many things about the practical order that we agree with, it must be added that his ideas on the nature of virtue,. prudence, justice, etc., are at least inconsistent. He failed on the speculative side to see the nature of human acts, and his moral philosophy faltered accordingly. . In his conception of prudence he took no account of the distinction between the virtues of speculative and practical reason on the one hand, and the widely different virtues of practical reason itself, that is, art and prudence, Art, in its. first meaning, determines the intellect with respect to a certain work that is external, as in the case of building; or at least external to the moral agent as such, for instance computation, logic and the like. . In the case of these speculative arts, the word " art " has acquired an extended meaning — it is an analogical name. Now a man may produce. a fine work, and accordingly. prove that he is a 'good artisan or artist, but this alone does not make him a good man. On the other hand, a good man may be a bad craftsman and a genuine artist can be a morally weak or even a wicked person. Naturally speaking, it is the moral virtues of justice, fortitude, and temperance, directed by the intellectual virtue of prudence, that qualify the man as good. The proper end of prudence, as we 'here take this term, is. the. perfection of a man in his whole life, and not 1. We must realize that the pejorative meaning of the word ` prudence' is also an ancient one. Even the Greek phronèsis and the Latin prudentia are often used to mean scheming narrowness, astuteness, or arrogance. In other words, ' prudence' taken in a sense which declines from the architectonic virtue of action is by no means new nor to be frowned upon. 2. Ibid., pp.219-220. 3. 'Ibid., p.260f£. 4. Ibid., p.71. . . ADAM SMITH'S THEORY U.: MORAL SENTIMENTS 247 just with.: respect to some particular end.. are of, course always in the: particular and: they are particular actions (whether those of speculative or of practical reason), but all stand in need of a direction which leads to an ultimate good,. the kind of activity that is in conformity with the right reason of. the individual agent. Now, this "right reason is prudence. . . To appreciate the shortcomings of Smith's theory, one must bear in mind that distinction already referred to, namely between-speculative a:nd practical truths. The former consists in the conformity of the nahid with what is.: if I. say that Socrates is seated, and he is, my saying this is true. But prudential truth; which is, practical, depends upon the conformity with right desire ; it cannot be divorced from the disposition of the appetite, which colors our judgment, so to speak. If a man is in an inordinate state of anger he is likely to judge that the wrong thing to do here and now is right. If the concupiscible appetite is out of control, he will judge that to eat or drink in excess is right here and now. While he knows it is wrong, he still orders himself to do it. It is in the actual :doing that prudence or imprudence' find their fulfilment. The whole point is that prudential truth: cannot' be detached in the sense of. speculative .truth. Now this is precisely .what Adam Smith. appears to. do in his. enaphasis on the impartial spectator. It is true that the good counsellor as such is in a sense a disengaged spectator, but he is not the one who is to perform the action which he counsels. The one who seeks advice. lutist still judge for himself whether the advice ought to be followed, and if so, he must. still order himself to carry it out ; he himself must be the final judge whom no one else can .replace. If we replace the rules of conduct by -those Of art we would set up for man an end which is not his own immanent good, but the good of something external to him, of a self outside, for whose actions-the inner man would nevertheless be held responsible. :By .putting the burden on the impartial observer, Smith seems to disintegrate the moral self. In so doing, he appears to emancipate the moral agent from the condition of the appetite, and thereby subjects the agent to a morally unjust and tyrannical objective truth. I-16 will return to this point later ; for the present it will dô to show how Smith may have been led to this confusion. A striking feature of the Theory. of Moral Sentiments is the lavish use- of--illustration-from-artTand--môre-particularly-from-drama,—At- - every turn he exemplifies the notions, of sympathy, propriety, approbation, etc., by reference to characters in dramas. Now there is a certain plausibility in this method, seeing that drama has to do with human. actions. Whatever the : explicit intention of the dramatist, if his work is good it will .be morally good. . The villainy of Jago would be both artistically and morally false if he were, made out to be good in what. he does ; the same for Cordelia if her actions were inter- 248 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE preted as one in quality with those of her sisters. Any one knows that in great tragedy such distortions would be revolting, impossible. We must allow that great drama can provide the moral philosopher with ample material and that its cathartic effect upon the audience is morally good. But such material remains quite remote from what an individual must do here and now ; to shed tears during a tragedy may—r-eveal_a basic__goodness,_but this_falls short of what one needs to be a good person. If Smith intended no more than illustration from drama of praiseworthy and blameful conduct, he would be without reproach in point of moral philosophy. Yet he appears to have more than that in mind, viz., some relation between the basis for true moral sentiment — the impartial spectator — and the viewer of a tragedy. The viewer may judge that right and wrong are being shown as they should be represented, but this judgment is not eo ipso a moral action. What he is witness to may illustrate a remote principle of action, and in this measure he can be an impartial observer. But this does not give him power to provide the proximate norm of action. Now Smith, if we understand him correctly, invests the impartial observer of ourselves with such a norm : when we follow his judgment we do right. Smith would be closer to the truth had his impartial observer been a device to bring out the role of conscience. But it is difficult to see how such a construction could be put upon his words. We have already suggested that the impartial observer Smith is after might be identified with conscience.. But this will not do, for conscience is one's own, nor does it constitute the proximate norm of action, else no one could do wrong. Smith was no doubt aware that more was needed to guarantee the goodness of an action, and in this he was right. But where, then, is the proximate norm to be found ? There are many good things in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, but it is vitiated by an attempt to provide an utterly detached rule of behaviour that will at the same time be sufficient to ensure the rightness of this particular action here and now. He sought a clarity which cannot be found in moral philosophy, not to mention the act. of prudence itself, which is incommunicable. He was not wholly ignorant of the latter point, but he shirked away from it for social reasons — as if he could not bear society's condemnation of a .person's action that would nonetheless be simply good. Smith did not underestimate the role of fortune in actions. Yet, here again, there is an over-emphasis on the other man's view. Fortune, good or bad, concerns Smith inasmuch as it affects the very quality of the action. For example, fortune may impede the intended effect of this action and thus, he would say; lessen the intrinsic good or evil of the act ; or, on the other hand, fortune can cause a good or evil action by facing, the agent with an unexpected situation. Aris- totle had -taught that fortune proper is nowhere to be found except in human actions, but could never be more than an accidental cause for which the agent himself should not be held to account) no matter how society might judge him. Let us mention, in passing, that fortune in histoiy and fortune in tragedy are not quite the same. In tragedy, misfortune is not to be divorced from a moral flaw in the hero himself — in his character and some past action of his own. whereas in history, misfortune may beset the best of man, and he will in no way be responsible for what so happens to him. The tragic hero is in some measure the object of blame when bad fortune strikes.; but can one truly blame the man who, performing an act of mercy, becomes therein the object of outrageous fortune ? This is frequent enough in history, but would lack the, significant unity which drama requires. • , Analysing the effect of fortune upon the amount of praise or blame which we give to any actions, Smith says that there are -three different things which constitute the whole nature and circumstances of the action, and must be the foundation of whatever quality can belong to. it. " These are the intention, the external act or move- , ment of the body, and the good or bad consequences. Of these three he says that the last two obviously• cannot be the foundation of any praise, or blame. Still, While all may admit this as an abstract principle, " when we come to particular cases, the actual consequences which happen to proceed from any action, have a very great effect upon our sentiments concerning its merit or demerit, and almost always either enhance or diminish our sense of both." 2 He 'then proceeds to examine and explain this "irregularity of sentiment" and here he. will assign its cause, influence and purpose. As to the cause of the influence of fortune on the praise or blame attributed to actions, he points out that we have passions of gratitude and revenge or resentment. These, although they can be and are directed to animals and: even to inanimate cibjects, are• properly directed to those which can be conscious of this passion' in the one having it. We wish those who are the object of our gratitude or resentment to be aware of it. Thus he says that in order to be a proper object of these passions three qualifications are necessary.2 It must be the cause of pleasure or pain. It must be itself capable of feeling these. Finally it must have produced these "from design, and-frorg—n—f. EaTiTa-t:IDIVrecl-of-in-the-one case, and-disapprovedof in the other." 4 It is by the first that the object is capable of exciting the passions ; by the second, that it is capable of gratifying 1. Ibid., p.84. 2. Ibid., p.85. 3. Ibid., p.88.- 4. Ibid. ' • ADAM SMITH'S' THEORY OF .MORAL SENTIMENTS 249 250 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE • ET .PHILOSOPHIQIIE • them'; and by the: third it "'is not only necessary'for.'their ,complete satisfaction, but as it gives a pleasure or pain that is 'both, exquisite and peculiar; it is likewise' an additional exciting cause. of those passions." ' Thus, because that 'which gives pleasure or pain. " is the sole exciting cause of gratitude or resentment," • we feel the need of expressing these passions even " though in the intentions of any person there-was-either-no-laudable-degree- •of benévolence-on the-one hand, or no blamable degree of malice on the other. .s When he inquires as to.. how far • the influence of fortune extends in this respect he shows first that it diminishes the sense of merit or demerit in those actions which fail of their effects, even when they arise. from.the best or the worst intentions.a Conversely it increases the sense of merit or demerit of actions, regardless of motives, when they accidentally cause extraordinary pleasure or pain. In a rather ambiguous passage he concludes that " good fortune either diminishes, or takes away altogether, all sense of guilt." 4 1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., "As what gives pleasure' or pain, therefore, either in one way or another, is the• sole exciting cause of. gratitude and resentment ; though the intentions of any person should be ever so proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever so improper and malevolent on the other ;. yet, if he has failed in producing either the good„or thé evil which he hed intended, as one of the exciting causes is wanting in both cases, less gratitude seems due to him in the one, and less resentment in the other. And, on the contrary, though in thé intentions of any person; there was either no laudable degree of benevolence on the one hand, or no blamable degree of malice on the other ; yet, if his actions should produce either•great good or great evil; as one of the exciting causes takes place upon both these occasions, some gratitude is apt to arise towards him' in the one, and some resentment in the other. A shadow of merit seems_to fall upon him' in the first, a shadow' of demerit in the second. And as the consequences of actions are altogether finder the • empire of Fortune, hence arises her influence upon"the sentiments Of mankind.with regard to merit and demerit." • 3..'Ibid., pp.88-89. ” The -effect of this influence of fortune is, first, to diminish our sense of the merit or demerit of those actions which arose from the most laudable or blamable intentions, when they fail of producing their proposed effects ; and, secondly, tb increase our sense of the merit or demerit of actions, beyond what is due to the motives of affections from which they proceed, when they 'accidentally give- occasion either to extraordinary pleasure or pain." 4. Ibid., p.92. " The person himself who either from passion or from the influence of bad company, has resolved, and perhaps taken measures to perpetrate some crime, but who has fortunately been prevented by an accident which put it out of his power, is sure, if he has any remains of conscience, to regard this event all his life after as a great and signal deliverance. He can never think of it without returning thanks to. Heaven, for having been thus graciously pleased 'to save him from the guilt in which he was just ready to plunge himself, and to hinder him from rendering all the rest of his life a scene of horror, remorse, and repentence. But though his hands are innocent, he is conscious that his heartis equally guilty as if he had actually executed what he was so fully resolved upon. It gives great ease to his conscience, however; to consider that the crime was not executed, though he knows that the failure arose from no virtue in him. He still considers himself less deserving of punishment and resentment ; and this good fortune either diminishes or takes away altogether, all sense of guilt. To remember how much he was resolved ADAM SMITH'S -THEORY' OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 251 Finally; in a passage which sp'eaks' of fortuine as the governor of the world 1 he attributes this " irregularity of sentiment " "to Nature. ' The purpose is to prevent -sentiments, thoughts and intentions. from becoming the object's of punishment, and force us to give human jurisdiction power• only over actions. He argues further that there is a ' certain utility in this that it makes men strive tõ implement their good will that it may produce its effects, rather than being satisfied with merely wishing for the good of their fellows. Even the evil aspect of blaming where . no blame is due is useful in teaching man " to reverence the happiness of his brethren, to tremble lest he should, even unknowingly, do anything that can hurt them." Smith attempts, in two chapters,$ to clarify the distinction between art and prudence. The result is more confusion. In the first chapter, having stated that one of the principal sources of beauty is utility (he fails to mention any others), he tries to analyse the pleasure which utility causes. He credits an unnamed philosopher approvingly with the idea that " the utility of any object pleases the master by perpetually suggesting to him the pleasure or conveniency which it is fitted to promote.".4 Then " the spectator enters by sympathy into the -sentiments of the master, and necessarily views the object Under the same agreeable-- aspect!' Smith, however, has-a discovery of his own to add : " But that this fitness, this happy contrivance of any production of art, should often be more valued than:.. the very, end for which it : was intended ; and that the exact adjustment: of the means for attaining any conveniency or pleasure, should frequently be more regarded, than that very conveniency or pleasure, in the attainment of which their whole merit would seem to consist has not, so far as T know; .been yet taken notice of by any body." 6 One example he gives is that. of the person. who has his pockets full of ., knickknacks. - He claims that such a one carries these not because of their utility but for their contrivance. ' His proof is based upon the observation that their combined utility would not compensate for the " fatigue of bearing the burden " of them. upon it, has no other effect than to make him regard his escape as the greater and more miraculous : for he still fancies that he. has escaped, and he looks back upon the danger to-which-his-peace_oLmind-was-exposedr with that_terrrir, w.th_which-one-who-is-in-safety —._. May sometimes remember the hazard he was in of falling over a precipice, and shudders with horror at the thought." — This analysis may be psychologically sound but, morally, the question-is one of guilty desire, no matter what the isstie. 1. Aid., p.96. 2. Ibid., pp.97-98. 3. mid., pp.158-171. 4. Ibid., p.158. 5. mid., pp.158-159. 252 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE Then he expands this principle by saying that this applies not only " to such frivolous objects " but that " it is often the secret motive of the most serious and important pursuits of both private and public life." 1 It is this deception of ourselves that causes the rustic to work all his life to attain some. of the . conveniences of the wealthy ; and then makes the same rustic wonder, when he has attained them, whether—they--were really-worth the-effort_afte ,1 —Smith-dwells on this for a while and then decides that " it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which ennoble and embellish human life." 2 He goes on by further reasoning of the same type to the idea that it is this same " spirit of : system " which recommends to us the promotion of the happiness of our fellow-creatures. Thus, while we can say that Smith perceives the utility contained in the notion of art, we must add that it is very difficult to see just what .his exact notion of utility was. - More than that, his notion of art was very scrappy. He seems unaware, for instance, that arts are not all of one kind ; that there are arts which transform some external matter, as in making a saw or L Ibid., p.159. 2. Ibid., pp.162-163. It is on this principle that he has based his later work The Wealth of Nations. A wise and all-provident Nature directly orders even the naturally selfish and rapacious to the good of society. " It is no purpose, that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields, and without a thought for the wants of his brethren, in imagination consumes himself the whole harvest that grows upon them. The homely and vulgar proverb, that the eye is larger than the belly, never was more fully verified than with regard to him. The capacity of his stomach bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires, and will receive no more than that of the meanest peasant. The rent he is obliged to distribute among those, who prepare, in the nicest manner, that little which he himself makës, use of, among those who fit up the place in which this little is to be consumed, among those who provide and keep in order all the different baubles and trinkets which are employed in the economy of greatness ; all of whom thus derive from his luxury and caprice, that share of the necessaries of life, which they would in vain have expected from his humanity or his justice. The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more. than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition. .• c-_.=Y.L ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 253 in sawing ; that the liberal arts direct immanent, operations, such as grammar, logic, mathematics, and. the like ; then there are the so- called fine arts, some of which are liberal, e.g. poetry, .wherea&.others demand considerable bodily exertion, such as hewing a statue out of stone. Had he payed more attention to this variety of arts, he might not have been so ready to link beauty with utility as he does. Smith also fails to take.. into account the difference between a good that is sought for its utility, such as medicine ; a good that one seeks for pleasure, such as food or drink ; and a good that one pursues for its own sake, such as a noble friend to whom one would remain faithful even through the worst of trials. There is of course the respect in which all our works of art have man himself for their purpose, and in this 'regard utility — in at least a broad sense — Would be a common note. For who would study logic if our ;mind did not need rectification ; or who would indulge, in computation if a machine could do the work for us ? There is of course an analogy between art and prudence, so that the moral philosopher may put it to some use ; but he should never proceed as . if they were identical. ' Smith surely nowhere says that they are. Still, he draws too heavily upon the analogy, and leaves us in a haze as to what he really has in mind. Let me explain.. He makes much of utility in the arts, and we allowed a broad sense in which this can be true in each and all of them. But when it comes to action, the case is no longer the same. If utility conveys the idea of what is for the sake of something. else, we will not say that all friends are sought for their utility, no matter how necessary it may be to have useful friends. The apparent likeliness of Smith's use of the analogy between art and prudence is perhaps to be found in the way hé associates beauty and utility which, in some areas of both nature and art, are inseparable. Darwin describes many natural instances in his reflections on the rôle of ornaments in natural selection. A handsome face is after all a composition of organs, this is, instruments of vital activities such as seeing, hearing, smelling, and so forth. The beauty of flying buttresses is destroyed when divorced . from their utility. Now, in the moral virtues there is utility and beauty as well, though they be of a quite different 'nature from the cases just mentioned. In analogy we must' of course be aware of the likeness which proportion provides, but it ii dust as importânt tô set+fortk-th differences 'between-the proportional terms. In the second of these two chapters, Smith wants to determine the extent to which the perception of that beauty with which the appearance of utility invests the characters and actions of men can be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation. We agree with him that there is beauty in virtue and deformity in vice. But, he allows, the utility which causes moral beauty does not account for (7) 254 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE all that virtue is. This qualification rouses our attention. It appears to bring him nearer to the truth. He aptly observes that it seems impossible to feel no more in the sentiment which constitutes the approbation of virtue than in that by which we approve of a convenient or well-contrived building. More particularly, the approbation of virtue involves a sense of propriety.' But then, in a passage which -deserves -to-be--quoted n full;Smith--againunwittingl-y-- -displays a basic confusion of art and prudence. It is to be observed that so far as the sentiment of approbation arises from the perception of this beauty of utility, it has no reference of any kind to the sentiments of others. If it were possible, therefore, that a person should grow up to manhood without any communication with society, his own actions might, notwithstanding, be agreeable or disagreeable to him on account of their tendency to his happiness or disadvantage. He might perceive a beauty of this kind in prudence, temperance, and good conduct, and a deformity in the opposite behaviour : he might view his own temper. and character with that sort of satisfaction with which we consider a well-contrived machine, in the one case : or with that sort of distaste and dissatisfaction with which we regard a very awkward and clumsy contrivance, in the other. As these perceptions, however, are merely a matter of taste, and have all the feebleness and delicacy of that species of perceptions, upon the justness of which what is properly called taste is founded, they probably would not be much attended to by one in his solitary and miserable condition. Even though they should occur to him, they would by no means have the same effect upon him, antecedent to his connection with society, which they would have in consequence of that connection. He would not be cast down with inward shame at the thought of this deformity ; nor would he be elevated with secret triumph of mind from the consciousness of the contrary beauty. He would not exult from the notion of deserving reward in the one case, nor tremble from the suspicion of meriting punishment in the other. All such sentiments suppose the idea of some other being, who is the natural judge of the person that feels them ; and it is only by sympathy with the decision of this arbiter of his conduct, that he can conceive, either the triumph of self-applause, or the shame of self-condemnation.2 • Smith is struggling here to add some note of distinction to the notion of moral action over that of art. However, it would seem, according to him, that the only judgment which the individual can make of his own actions in isolation from society is that of art. This in itself is significant. He then reverts to the merit or demerit as depending upon a judgment of self by another as other — the ". impartial spectator " — and again virtue finally consists in the judgment. 1. Ibid., p.167. 2. Ibid., pp.170-171. ADAM .SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 255 At this juncture we may refer to St. Thomas's doctrine on the proper and ultimate act of prudence, which is to command? Concerning things to be done (agibilia) there are three, acts; 1 `First, the act of counsel which considers the various means ; after this, the act 'of judgment about these Means which are found by counsel, and this is done by the speculative reason ;, then, since prudence is about actions to be performed, there is a third act which applies what was counseled and decided to what must be done here and now, namely the act of command, attended by the actual doing. This points to a wide difference between art and prudence, for " the perfection of art consists in judging, but not in commanding." Thus, insisting as he does on the sentiment arising from the judgment of another on the character or action, Smith overlooks this distinction between art and prudence. More than that, it can be said that for the most part he would insist that human actions are more under the rule of art than under the rule of prudence. There are several other passages to illustrate this. In the discussion of self-command 2 he compares the development of perfect self-command in all things to the making of a perfect work of art. He says that just as it is an inferior artist who is completely satisfied with his production so it is in the character of virtue.a He adds that contrary to the artist who sits down in leisure to work undisturbed, the man of virtue must operate in all the contingencies and difficulties of life. It would be easy enough, here as in other places, to interpret his analogies favourably — if only we could forget the purpose for which Smith uses them. There is something to the opinion that Smith's Theory of Moral sentiments is a sane reaction against the rationalism of his time, provided we stress the qualification " of his time." That rationalism was indeed most simplistic : all moral problems and actions were to be solved and governed by pure reason. Man had at last discovered the clue leading to unhampered self-possession. Smith shows the crisis this oversimplification leads to. His Theory lays bare the successive contradictions which rationalism inevitably gets involved-in. The solution of one contradiction leads to another. Smith still belongs to that phase of rationalism which did not accept contradiction as a-. legitimate step toward a ' higher level.' But he was on the -way towards emancipation from erudential truth. La vérité prudentielle, la vérité dans l'action dépend de la rectitude de l'appétit. Cette condition est en pratique extrêmement dure, à tel point que l'histoire de la philosophie pullule de positions et de doctrines où l'on essaie d'émanciper l'intelligence de toute soumission à l'appétit, afin de 1. Ha Hue, q.47, a.8, c. 2. SMITH, op. cit., pp.210 ff. 3. Ibid. p.221. 256 LAVAL THAOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE contourner cette difficulté de bien agir que chacun éprouve en lui-même. Cette tentative regarde surtout l'action politique et cela se comprend aisément, car cette action engage directement le bien de la communauté, de tous et chacun. Or, soutenir que la vérité prudentielle en matière politique est conditionnée par la rectitude de l'appétit du politique, veut dire que le jugement du politique comme tel dépendra aussi de sa conduite privée : queue hon p~ iqussloit_être im homme de bien. Si don.__ ç on pouvait déterminer une règle prochaine qui, d'une part, garantirait la vérité dans l'action politique, et qui, d'autre part, serait indépendante de la condition de l'appétit de celui qui agit, le bien public, semble-t-il, serait bien mieux assuré, son accomplissement serait moins sous la dépendance de la condition subjective du politique. On établirait ainsi une science politique dont la vérité serait pratique, et qui serait dès lors un substitut de la prudence. La prudence serait coextensive à la dinotica.' Does Smith's work fall in line with this attempt ? A superficial glance at the Theory of moral sentiments might lead us to believe that he was precisely reacting against this rationalistic emancipation of man from the role of appetite in practical truth. Actually, his whole effort appears bent upon rationalizing this appetite. His clearly stated purpose was : to discover a " precise or distinct measure " by which the fitness or propriety of our moral actions can be ascertained or judged. But how can this possibly be reconciled with Smith's identification of sympathy with the moral sense ? Let us not forget his meaning of the term " sympathy." If we used it in connection with the very basis of morality, it would have a quite different meaning. It would mean the conformity of our appetite with an end that is truly good, and the conformity of our intellect with right appetite. Hence, while truth in action is relative to right appetite, the practical judgment of what is right or wrong is the judgment of the individual person, and its value depends essentially upon the above-mentioned conformity. The basis of Smith's morality finally resides in the sympathy of one man with the action of another. This sympathy is but an alienation of self in sympathy as we understand it. It is still, in a more subtle way, a rationalistic escape from the moral good. The sympathy he speaks of is, in truth, the subject of a speculative judgment. The value of the other's action is judged by our ability to sympathize with his action and.jugxnent, and the value of our action and judgment is measured by the others's . ability to sympathize with these in ourselves. This vicious circle is still a form of subjection of man to man. In what sense can the individual person be free in his moral judgments ? Cette tentative de contourner les exigences de la vérité dans l'action n'en est pas moins une révolte contre la vérité et contre la liberté de conscience. 1. Charles DE KONINCE, Révolte contre la vérité prudentielle, 1943, pp.109-121. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 257 Elle conduit vers la pire tyrannie qui se puisse concevoir, non pas parce que ceux qui refuseraient de se soumettre à un ,régime politique . édifié, en théorie et. en pratique, sur la négation de la vérité prudentielle;: seraient jetés dans des camps de concentration ou ,tout. . t éliminés ' —ne craignez pas ceux qui tuent le corps et ne peuvent tuer' l' m,e - mais parce qu'elle tend à exterminer la notion même de vérité' prudentielle et de' liberté de conscience. Cette négation est d'autant plus sinistre :qu'elle fait appel à cela. même qu'elle veut détruire: Il est si • facile de cacher une Anie d'esclave sous l'étiquette d'homme libre.' Smith's idea of sympathy, far from recognizing the role of appetite in action, very definitely rules out this appetite as the faculty of a self-determining agent. Smith alienates the moral self into the other- ness of society. Man must judge his own worth according to his attunement to the society he lives in, and to society as it is. Such an idea seems totalitarian.. And this alienation is logically carried through in conformity with Smith's original intention. " We are not at present, he said, examining upon what principles, a perfect being would approve of the punishment of bad actions;, but upon what principles so weak and imperfect a creature as man actually and in fact approves of it.'.' . Unless the approbation of .the;iatter. is :established by Smith as a true criterion of the, value of our individual actions,: his very theory of sympathy -becomes -wholly. superfluous.. But "as= soon as we accept this approbation as .a norm, his. theory: of synpathy becomes inescapable: The attractiveness of this position lies in the fact that it does convey the relevance of appetite in action and apparently recognize. this role. . It is nonetheless rationalistic in the end, for ' the self is objectivly alienated, projected into detached otherness. , Thus the self can treat itself as an external object, and place the burden of responsibility upon the self's otherness, upon society into which it has been absorbed. S In fact the text we have just quoted from Smith is a very significant statement of an idea that Hegel will finally reject, namely, the distinction between things as they are and things as they ought to be. While Smith maintains this distinction, his whole purpose is confined to things as they are as the very norm of what we must do. 'Hume and Hegel would explicitly cut all ties from the 'very transcendance involved in the idea of what ought to be as opposed to what is in fact. "-It-is-not-what-is-that-makes us furious and torments us, Hegel says, but rather the fact that what is, is not as it ought to be ; . once we recognize that that which is, is as it ought to be, that is, not arbitrary, nor contingent, then we also recognize that it must be as it is." In other words, if I could eventually identify myself with the impartial spectator, ought would be what is. 1. Charles DE KortLNCx, Révolte contre la vérité prudentielle, loc. cit. 258 LAVAL THAOLOGGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE One of the striking features of this logic is that at the very moment the human person is to enjoy freedom it is compelled to become the moral of its fellow-man. All becomes caprice and the person must free itself from utter randomness of its own actions by ignominiously subjecting itself to the Big Brother " impartial spectator," an impartial observer who is actually as subject to brute, irrational, fact as the depersonalized individual. -What ãre-the tr ïths that Smith can —tit to make his idea of sympathy hinge upon ? There is first of all the principle : Qualis unusquisque est talis finis videtur ei.l This indeed shows well enough the role of appetite in action. But how is one to know the right way to act ? Can moral science tell us exactly what, is right and what is wrong in such a way that we would only have to :.apply this knowledge to any given situations in order to ensure the right or wrong of our actions ? At the outset of his Ethics Aristotle had observed that in the sciences of action we must be content, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received ; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits ; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.2 In a subsequent passage he repeats that this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter ; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness ; for they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.3 1. ST. THOMAS, In III Ethic., lect.13. 2. Nichomachean Ethics, I, 3, 1094 b 20. 3. Op. cit., II, 2, 1104 a 1. — St. Thomas's commentary reads as follows : " Determinat [Philosophus] modum inquirendi de talibus. Et digit, quod illud oportet primo supponere, quod omnis sermo qui est de operabilibus, sicut est iste, debet tradi typo, idest exemplariter, vel similitudinarie, et non secundum certitudinem ; sicut dictum est in prooemio Lotius libri. Et hoc ideo, quia sermones sunt exquirendi secundum conditionem materiae, ut ibidem dictum est. Videmus auteur, quod ea quae suet in operationibus moralibus, et alia quae sunt ad hoc utilia, scilicet bona exteriora, non habent in seipsis aliquid stans per modum necessitatis, sed mania sunt contingentia et variabilia. Sicut

ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 259 No moral science, however elaborate, can. become a substitute for prudence whose truth depends upon the condition of bur appetite. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas go so far as to say .that moral science contributes little to virtue. -That the good should be dône and evil avoided is true everywhere and always. This is the most general principle of all, but it does not tell what is to be done here and now. That we must act justly is a less universal principle, which,must always be applied in matters of justice. if we narrow it down to. ' One must pay one's debts,' its application here and now may be quite. uncertain, for it is not plain that one must pay one's debts under all conceivable circumstances ; to do so could, in a given case, be an act of treason. Again, an ill-disposed person might use this type of uncertainty as a pretext for not paying his debts where he should. - That the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human .acts. should not be interpreted to mean that he is the proximate rule for the actions of others. He is such a rule only for himself. For others.. his virtue is never more than a type, a general, remote. measure. The way in which the good man. is to be imitated is in doing what each person should do in his own contingent circumstances. The proximate rule of what I should do here and now is ineffable, incommunicable in purely rational terms. An impartial spectator,, no :matter how wise and well-intentioned, could not be such a. norm. The alienation of, the self . Smith harries_. through on the _.highest level, as we can see in his understanding; of charity towards neighbour which, to him, means that we must love our neighbour as much as we love ourselves, to the point where self and neighbour are completely interchangeable. In truth, however, we must . love ourselves more than our neighbour, as St. Thomas explains : There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above (q.25, a.7) : so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person. This is evident from the very, reason for loving :

etiam accidit in operibus medicinalibus quae sunt circa sana. Quia ipsa dispositio corporis sanandi et res quae assumantur ad sanandum, multipliciter variantur. — Et cum sermd moralium etiam in universalibus sit incertus et variabilis, adhuc 'aegis incertus est si quis veut ulterius descendere trahendo doctrinam de singulis in speciali. Hoc enim non cadit neque sub arte, neque sub aliqua narratione. Quia causae singularium operabilium variantur infinitis modis.: Unde-iudi'ciunr de sin' g &hha linquitur-pr-udentiae-urïiU[5Ct7jlltque. Et hoc est, quod oported ipsos operantes per suam prudentiam intendere ad considerandum, ea quae convent agere secundum praesens tempus, consideratis omnibus particularibus circumstantiis ; sicut oportet medicum facere in medicando, et gubernatorem in regimine, navis. Quamvis autem hic sermo sit . talis, idest universaliter incertus, in particulari auteur inenarrabilis, tamen attentare debemus, ut aliquod =cilium super hoc homini conferamus, per quod scilicet dirigatur in suis operibus. In II Ethic., lect.2. nn.258-9. Cf. Book II, lect.8. nn.333-4 ; lect.9, n.351 : lect. 11. a. 369 and n.381 : Book III, lect.1, n.390 : lect.2. n.399 : etc.

260 LAVAL THÉOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE since, as stated above (q.25, aa. 1, 12), God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded ; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his followship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should-be-a-par-trier-with-himinthat-share.--T-herefore-man,-out-of_charity,ought to love himself more than his neighbor : in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.' It would therefore be contrary to charity to sacrifice one's own spiritual good for that of our neighbour. This shows how deeply perverse is .the alienation which is at least intimated by Smith. And while his interpretation of the law of charity is in contradiction with several of his other positions, such as that one may not commit evil for the sake of a good, Smith has nonetheless erred in the matter at hand, and the evolution of rationalism will gradually eliminate the share of truth that remained associated with it in his Theory. • Smith's idea of charity already foreshadows the contradictory concept of brotherly love in Marxism. While on the one hand Marxism teaches that the individual self is the highest divinity, at the same time, the individual person is completely sacrificed for the welfare of some one or more individuals just as expendible. Here again the absolute assertion of the self implies its absolute negation. No matter how we look at rationalism, it leads to a contradiction eventually to be accepted in principle ; to the " yes and no of Hegelianism and Marxism. Smith was saved only by inconsistency. Some of the greater difficulties he sidesteps by suddenly bringing in the " Supreme Judge." But his God is never but a " deus ex machina " appealed to when a conflict arises between the spectator within and those without. Rationalism will soon accept this conflict as a principle, and substitute to God himself the " fecundity of contradiction." The same idea of alienation underlies Smith's conception of justice as the only rule which allows no looseness or free interpretation in its application to particular cases. Justice thus becomes the first of the virtues. Now justice is not toward oneself but toward another. If held to be the architectonic virtue in lieu of prudence, then again we have alienation : virtue is primarily " ad alterum." And since justice is in the appetite, and if it is to have the primacy which in fact belongs to the intellectual virtue of prudence, justice and, accordingly, moral life as a whole become primarily irrational. The same irrationality may be seen to follow logically from Smith's neglect to distinguish practical reason from speculative reason. When 1. IIa IIae, q.26, a. 4, c. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 261 the whole burden of reason in action is placed upon speculative reason, the realm of action itself when characterized by more sentiment becomes, qua practical, irrational.' That reason which attains the good as gold is denied, and hence the good as such becomes inaccessible to anything but speculative reason. It is not only in its moral philosophy that rationalism turns out to be irrationalism. This holds true of its most abstract and speculative teachings. The most basic idea of rationalism : is that- only the humanly rational is real ; that the only rationality things have : in themselves is the rationality they have for me. Human- reason as such then becomes the very principle of their rationality. But actually what is first and most rational to me is least rational in itself.' Hence, if the rational to us becomes the measure of rationality of things in themselves, then what is least rational in them is at the same time the. norm of what is most rational in them. It would of course be -unfair and childish to hold Smith responsible for the conclusions his Theory of Moral' .Sentiments leads to. ' Like Hume he is typical of his Age, a particularly rootless one: 'It is amazing how little they •knew • of the 'ancient' questions and answers concerning their subjects, and how confident was their • approach. Following in the footsteps of their • immediate forebears, Continental and English, they philosophized in a way that leads, to the opposite of both speculative and practical wisdom. Mother MARIE' DE JÉsus, •R S:H.M.

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